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The text of plaintiffs' memoranda and portions of law students'
and attorneys' affidavits are reproduced without alteration, except for
minor technical and stylistic corrections and the conforming of citations
to the Uniform System of Citation. Editorial comments and summaries
of affidavits are placed within brackets.
Introduction
The memoranda that follow are the arguments submitted by vari-
ous San Francisco neighborhood groups on the legal question whether
a grand jury which lacks the power to indict and performs functions
limited to investigating public bodies, obtaining information, issuing re-
ports, and initiating impeachment procedures should be governed by
the same constitutional standards that govern a grand jury with the
power to return criminal indictments.
This litigation began in 1972 when the San Francisco Grand Jury
had the power both to investigate and to issue indictments. After Fed-
eral District Judge Charles B. Renfrew issued an opinion stating that
a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury selection had been
properly alleged,' the superior court judges in San Francisco created
a second grand jury, the function of which was to be limited to investi-
gations. Their hope was that this grand jury could be selected by "blue
ribbon" standards. As the memoranda explain, during the summer of
1975 the presiding judge carefully picked a grand jury consisting of
a number of lawyers, accountants, and other professionals (many of
whom were personal friends or politicians presently out of office),
which he believed would be best able to investigate the agencies in city
and county government. Plaintiffs, representing various neighborhood
groups of poor people, non-Whites, and women, persisted in this litiga-
tion because the groups felt that being excluded from the investigative
grand jury was as improper as being excluded from the indicting grand
jury.
On October 28, 1975, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion
for partial summary judgment with respect to the classes of women and
non-White ethnic minorities. Judge Renfrew stated that "the same
standards for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination should
be applied to the civil investigative grand jury as applied to the former
unitary grand jury."'  With reference to the requirement that groups
1. Quadra v. Superior Ct., 378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
2. Quadra v. Superior Ct., Civil No. C-72-1689, at 10 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 28,
1975).
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against whom discrimination is claimed be "identifiable," the court de-
termined that non-White ethnic minorities and women constituted such
classes and that "their substantial underrepresentation on the grand
jury [could] be the basis for a prima facie case of unconstitutional dis-
crimination in selection."3
Relying on plaintiffs' statistical information and on the "rates of
error" (explained below) which the statistics revealed, the court held
that "the persistent underrepresentation of each of the two groups both
as nominees and as grand jurors. . . is sufficiently substantial to estab-
lish a prima facie case of unconstitutional exclusion." 4 The court then
rejected as insufficient to rebut plaintiffs' prima facie showing the two
explanations offered by defendants for the composition of the grand
jury they had selected-that they had lacked the intent to discriminate
and that higher qualifications are necessary for the investigative grand
jury than are required for the criminal grand jury.5 The court admitted
that some standards could be established for selection, if such standards
were clearly articulated and related to the task of the investigative
grand jury.6
3. Id.
4. Id. at 14.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 16-17.
Editorial Note: On January 26, 1976, San Francisco's superior court judges voted
to select the next civil grand jury at random from the voters' registration list. S.F.
Examiner, Jan. 27, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
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INDIANA QUADRA, et al.,
Plaintiffs No. C-72-1689 CBR
vs. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUP-
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE PORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MO-
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN TION FOR PARTIAL SUM-
FRANCISCO et al., MARY JUDGMENT
Defendants
CONTENTS
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 569
Questions Presented -------------------------------- 579
Can a Grand Jury Whose Functions Include Investigating
and Issuing Reports on All City Agencies and Officials, with
Power To Obtain Information That Is Virtually Unlimited
and with the Ultimate Power of Impeaching any Public Offi-
cial, Be Selected in a Manner That Would Be Deemed Un-
constitutional if the Grand Jury Had the Additional Task of
Indicting Persons Accused of Criminal Activity? 579
Argument ----------------------------------- 579
I. The Constitutional Standards Governing Grand Jury Selec-
tion Are No Different for a Grand Jury Described as "Civil"
or "Investigative." The Constitution Requires That All
Grand Juries Be Truly Representative and Independent. For
All the Years Under Attack, the San Francisco Grand Jury
Has Never Satisfied the Constitutional Standard and as Such
Has Consistently Been Unconstitutional --------------------------- 579
A. The United States Supreme Court Has Consistently Re-
quired That the Grand Jury Must Be "A Body Truly
Representative of the Community" --------------- 580
B. "Civil" Juries Are Held to the Identical Constitutional
Standard As Criminal Juries. Defendants' Assertion
That a Different Constitutional Standard Applies Is
Totally Without Support ---------------------- 581
C. Most Grand Juries Today Are Primarily Investigative
Bodies. Nonetheless No Different or Lower Constitu-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
tional Standard Has Ever Been Applied or Permitted
to Stand 581
II. The Investigating Power of the Grand Jury and the Impor-
tant Interests It Is Supposed To Protect and Vindicate Show
the Compelling and Substantial Need for an Investigative
Grand Jury That Is "A Body Truly Representative of the
Community" 584
Ill. The Interest Defendants Advance To Justify a Blue-Ribbon
Grand Jury Are Neither Compelling Nor Substantial; There-
fore the Personal Selection System Has No Adequate Justi-
fication and Must Be Changed to a System Conforming to
Constitutional Standards - 590
Conclusion 597
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issue that remains to be decided in this case is whether the
grand jury, potentially one of the most powerful institutions in our sys-
tem of government, and one of the most ancient, is required to be rep-
resentative if it has all the power and responsibility normally given to
a grand jury, except that of issuing indictments.7  The recent decision
of the defendants to create two separate grand juries, one with the
power to indict and the other with all the remaining civil and investigat-
ing power, has narrowed the issue to the legal effect of such a separa-
tion of functions. A history of this case and a discussion of how the
grand jury has been selected in San Francisco will help put in focus
the issue that remains.
Plaintiffs began this action in 1972 to challenge the San Francisco
Superior Court judges' practice of hand-picking grand jurors (often
from among their personal friends and acquaintances), a practice that
has year after year produced grand juries that bear almost no relation-
ship to the population of San Francisco in terms of (a) its rich ethnic
diversity, (b) the varied economic groups that reside in the city, (c)
the age mix of the city, and (d) the two sexes that live here. Plaintiffs'
original complaint referred to the demographic make-up of San Fran-
cisco's grand juries between the years 1960 and 1972 and alleged that
non-White ethnic minorities were underrepresented by about three-
fourths (i.e., they composed only about one-fourth as many seats on
7. This question was mentioned but explicitly left unresolved in the court's earlier
opinion in this case. See Quadra v. Superior Ct., 378 F. Supp. 605, 626 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
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the grand jury as their population warranted), that women were also
underrepresented by about three-fourths, that persons living in the
poorer sections of the city were underrepresented by from 60 to 80
percent and that both blue-collar workers and persons under forty were
almost totally excluded from the grand juries." The Honorable Charles
B. Renfrew reviewed this complaint in an opinion filed May 16, 1974,
and concluded that (1) "the selection system in San Francisco as de-
scribed by defendants does contain opportunities to discriminate"9 and
(2) the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case of discrimination
as to non-Whites and women if plaintiffs' statistical allegations were
true. A technical defect in the complaint concerning the allegations
about the poor and the young was corrected in an amended complaint
filed July 15, 1974, and defendants' subsequent motion to dismiss the
complaint was rejected on March 7, 1975.
The grand juries that have been selected since the initial filing
of this complaint continue to be grossly unrepresentative of the groups
represented by plaintiffs in this action. The 1973 grand jury contained
only five non-Whites (out of nineteen), only five women, only three
persons under 40, only two persons who live in the poor areas of the
city, and not one blue-collar worker.10 The 1974-75 grand jury, com-
posed partly of volunteers (through a system that will be explained be-
low), contained only three non-Whites (one of whom was subsequently
asked to resign), again only five women, again only three persons
under 40, four persons who live in the poverty areas of the town, and
only one blue-collar worker. The 1975-76 grand jury, which is now
"limited" to the "civil" or "investigative" functions of the grand jury
through a system of "bifurcation" that will be discussed below, has not
been finally impaneled at the filing of this motion, but it is being picked
with extraordinary care to ensure that it will be once again a blue-
ribbon panel.
The allegations that were raised by plaintiffs' initial brief thus re-
main essentially unchanged from the time of initial filing and clearly
state a prima facie case of discrimination that shifts the burden of ex-
planation to the defendants. Defendants have not once, however, of-
fered any explanation that would adequately explain why these signifi-
cant population groups are so dramatically underrepresented. The re-
mainder of this memorandum will summarize the legal principles that
govern this situation and will argue that defendants cannot constitution-
8. See id. at 617-19.
9. Id. at 617.
10. For detailed statistics, see Appendix A.
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ally be permitted to continue selecting grand jurors by the present
method. Before proceeding to the argument, however, plaintiffs will
outline the present selection method in more detail.
The Current Method of Selecting Grand Jurors
in San Francisco
Each of the 26 superior court judges in San Francisco nominates
five persons each year to be placed in the pool of potential grand jurors.
Each judge has his own method of selecting nominees, but it appears
that many of the judges nominate persons they know (1) as friends,
(2) as business associates, or (3) because of some previous or current
political contact."1 The Honorable Byron Arnold, the presiding judge
11. Affidavits submitted by defendants on November 14, 1972, outline the differ-
ent selection procedures of the judges and illustrate the personal nature of the nominat-
ing procedure. Some typical comments from these affidavits are the following:
The Honorable Carl H. Allen: "Besides nominating those whom I knew on a per-
sonal basis, I have accepted the good judgment of others and have then screened these
candidates in accordance with the same standards outlined above."
The Honorable Raymond J. Arata: "I have made my nominations from friends and
acquaintances, persons recommended by friends, acquaintances, or by anyone, provided
that I was convinced, after making my own investigation (including personal interviews
where deemed necessary), that such person or persons were indeed competent, educated,
experienced and possessed of sufficient community interest to warrant my selection of
their names for nomination."
The Honorable John A. Ertola: "Based on many years of personal community so-
cial service and six years as a county-wide elected local legislator; plus two years as pre-
siding officer of the local legislative body of this City and County, I review the names
of persons who have demonstrated an interest in the community at large, expressed
thoughts that in my experience and judgment indicate a fairness and objectivity of ap-
proach, and either personally represent the various segments of our society or by experi-
ence possess an understanding of our community and desire to serve it."
The Honorable Joseph Karesh: "I name as prospective Grand Jurors persons whom
I know, whether they ask or do not ask to be selected. I also ask people to serve who
are recommended to me by others whom I know."
The Honorable Francis McCarty: "During the time I have served on the Superior
Court, I have nominated persons whom I have known, and persons whose names have
been recommended to me by people whose judgment I know and respect."
The Honorable Charles S. Peery: "The persons nominated by me have been se-
lected from the following: personal acquaintances, recommendations of personal friends,
recommendations of my colleagues on the Superior Court, recommendations by public
officials, by former grand jurors and by other persons not personally known to me who,
in one way or another, have indicated that the prospective nominee possessed a desire
to serve as a grand juror."
The Honorable S. Lee Vavuris: "The five persons whom I nominated for the 1972
Grand Jury were individuals who contacted me, indicating a desire to serve on the Grand
Jury. Two of these were individuals who had been interviewed by Judge Byron Arnold,
who indicated to me that he felt them qualified."
The Honorable Ira A. Brown, Jr., has nominated at least three of the wives of his
January 1976] QUADRA v. SUPERIOR COURT
in 1972, emphasized in his deposition that he obtained names through
personal and business acquaintances. 12  The Honorable Robert J.
Drewes, presiding judge in 1975, stated in his deposition that he also
chooses close personal and business friends 13 but added that he some-
times specifically asks Terry Francois and Robert Gonzales, both cur-
rent members of the board of supervisors, for suggestions.' 4 Finally,
one of Judge Drewes's recent nominees, Alvin F. Derre, was a former
political associate of his.' 5 Such political affiliations are particularly
threatening to the independence of the grand jury, an essential ingredi-
ent to its power that will be discussed in more detail below. Appendix
B indicates the previous offices held by the current superior court
judges, all of which present potential conflict of interests problems.'8
former law partners at Thelen, Marrin, Johnson, and Bridges, Gail W. Lane (in 1972
and 1973), Jean Sullivan (in 1973), and Elizabeth McPike (in 1974 and 1975).
One family has had its members nominated an unusual number of times. Mr. Wil-
liam J. Welsh was nominated by Judge Robert W. Merrill in 1970 and served as a grand
juror that year. The next year his wife, Nita, was nominated by Judge Lawrence S.
Mana, and he put her name forward also in 1972, 1973, and 1974. Their daughter, Vic-
toria, was nominated by Judge Francis McCarty in 1973, and she has been nominated
also in 1974 and 1975. See Affidavits of Nov. 14, 1972, of The Honorable Carl H.
Allen, The Honorable Raymond J. Arata, The Honorable John A. Ertola, The Honorable
Joseph Karesh, The Honorable Francis McCarty, The Honorable Charles S. Peery, The
Honorable S. Lee Vavuris, The Honorable Ira A. Brown, Jr., Quadra v. Superior Ct.,
Civil No. C-72-1689 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 20, 1972).
12. Judge Arnold explained his recent nominees as follows: Stewart Adams was
a person who ran a restaurant that Judge Arnold dined at frequently. Josph Arellano
was the husband of the real estate agent through whom Judge Arnold bought his house.
Charlton Buckley was the son of a longtime friend. George Sanderson had been recom-
mended by "union labor friends of mine." John McGinty was a personal friend who
had worked with Judge Arnold's wife on charitable affairs. Maurice Delman had been
a personal friend for 30 years. Harry Horn was the father-in-law of a friend. Clarence
Krieger is the son of a man Judge Arnold knew. James T. Rodman is Judge Arnold's
son-in-law. Miriam Sweet was a close personal friend of Judge Arnold's wife and Byron
Samuel was recommended by a friend. Deposition of The Honorable Byron Arnold,
Nov. 28, 1972, at 11-17, Quadra v. Superior Ct., Civil No. C-72-1689 (N.D. Cal., filed
Sept. 20, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Judge Arnold's deposition].
13. Richard 0. Herman married a friend of Judge Drewes 25 years ago. James
A. Horsberg was a classmate of Judge Drewes at the Harvard Boys School. Susan Met-
calf and Diane Nielson are persons that Judge Drewes knows socially. Deposition of
The Honorable Robert Drewes, May 8, 1975, at 25-30, Quadra v. Superior Ct., Civil
No. C-72-1689 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 20, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Judge Drewes's
deposition].
14. Id. at 6. Note that Judge Charles S. Peery also stated that he received recom-
mendations from public officials. See note 11 supra.
15. "We were interested in a political group that was very active many years ago
in finding and supporting suitable or competent candidates for the Board of Supervisors."
Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 27.
16. Justice Leonard M. Friedman of the California Court of Appeal has recently
summarized the problem in the following language: "The California Penal Code's flac-
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Each judge thus brings his own personal preferences into the se-
lection process, and it is logical and natural that the grand juries should
roughly resemble the demographic characteristics of the judges them-
selves. Of the present 26 judges, none are women; 17 only two are non-
White;'8 none are under 40;19 none live in the poor areas of the city
as defined for the purpose of this litigation;20 and of course none make
less than $11,000,21 nor is any a blue-collar worker. All the judges
have achieved their present positions by working hard within the pres-
ent political structure and either by making the acquaintance of political
leaders who would nominate them or by seeking election within the
city. They thus generally have links with those currently in power, fre-
quently including the city officials whom the grand jury is supposed to
investigate. A question inevitably arises whether a grand jury hand-
selected by persons with close ties to city government will have suffi-
cient independence to scrutinize carefully the activities of that city gov-
ernment.
The judges also have perspectives that grow out of their personal
experiences and the experiences of their generation, perspectives that
may come in conflict with the current standards governing jury selec-
tion. Judge Byron Arnold, for instance, stated explicitly in his deposi-
tion that he thought that men should be preferred over women for
cid directions for grand jury selection contain no effective assurance of broad socio-eco-
nomic representation. The continued absence of meaningful statutory controls only
burdens the courts with repeated attacks on grand jury selection methods. Although an
unrepresentative grand jury may not prejudice the individual defendant, it is detrimental
to community aspirations and incompatible with the egalitarian aims of the Fourteenth
Amendment. When discriminatory methods damage the community and not the ac-
cused, a representative lawsuit is available to redress the community's wrong." People
v. Superior Ct. (Dean), 38 Cal. App. 3d 966, 975-76, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1974)
(citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
17. Answers to Interrogatories, June 23, 1975, at 2, Quadra v. Superior Ct., Civil
No. C-72-1689 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 20, 1972) (Judge Robert J. Drewes) [hereinafter
cited as Judge Drewes's Answers to Interrogatories].
18. Id. One of these two judges, The Honorable Joseph G. Kennedy, apparently
did not submit any nominations for the 1975-76 grand jury. This phenomenon has not
been explained.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Defendants stated that The Honorable Jay Pfotenhauer fives in the Mission.
See id. at 2. Nonetheless, his address, 349 Cumberland, is not within the Mission dis-
trict as defined for purposes of this litigation. In Appendix A, plaintiffs indicate that
the geographical boundaries have been picked by reference to the property values and
median incomes of the various census tracts in the city, and that area west of Dolores
Street where Judge Pfotenhauer lives is substantially more affluent than the poor areas
as defined for this litigation.
21. Id. at 3.
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grand jury duty.22 Plaintiffs point out that these improper perspectives
may exist, not for the purpose of maligning the defendants, who have
served San Francisco ably and well in most respects, but to suggest that
any group of individuals will bring to any selection task its own personal
perspective. If, then, our goal is to avoid discrimination and to impanel
a grand jury that is "a body truly representative of the community,"2
it seems necessary to insist that some more neutral selection procedure
be employed.24
After each judge submits his nominations for the forthcoming
grand jury, 30 names are traditionally selected at random from among
the 120 or 130 nominees. These 30 persons are then instructed to
come to the presiding judge's courtroom where they are interrogated
by the presiding judge or by the jury clerk. Traditionally, the presiding
judge then selects from among the 30, without giving any indication
of what standards have been used to eliminate the 11 who are excused.
This process thus introduces a second layer of possible bias. Not only
is the original pool hand-selected by the panel of judges who pick and
choose from among their friends and acquaintances, but in addition the
22. The dialogue on this question was as follows:
Question: In selecting a grand jury, do you believe that women are as competent
to serve as grand jurors as men?
Judge Arnold: Women are competent to serve as grand jurors. My preference
would be that it should be comprised principally of men, however.
Q: Why is that?
A: Well, because in a body such as a Grand Jury, I think that the Committee
chairmen and the personal members of these committees, would be better served by men
as a whole than by women, and we have several ladies on our Grand Jury now, who
function along with the men very, very well, but I think that the men make better chair-
men, and members of the committees than do the women.
Q: Is there any particular reason for that?
A: No. No particular reason. Men are just better suited for the work than
women. Judge Arnold's deposition, supra note 12, at 24-25 (emphasis added). Judge
Drewes may perhaps exhibit the same general perspective, though in a more subtle man-
ner, through his membership in the all-male Bohemian Club. See Judge Drewes's depo-
sition, supra note 13, at 39. Many of the other judges belong to exclusive clubs of one
sort or another. See Appendix B infra.
23. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970), quoting Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
24. Defendants have stated explicitly in their depositions and answers to interroga-
tories that the population groups that have been so dramatically underrepresented on San
Francisco's grand juries-the non-White, women, the young, and the poor-are just as
competent and qualified to serve as grand jurors as anyone else. See Judge Drewes's
Answers to Interrogatories, supra note 17, at 4; Judge Arnold's deposition, supra note
12, at 26, 28; Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 32, 37. Nonetheless, defend-
ants have consistently and repeatedly selected grand juries that underrepresent these
groups. This must mean that the present selection method inevitably produces unrepre-
sentative grand juries.
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presiding judge makes the ultimate selections without review or reasons
given. Many judges exercise this discretion wisely, but the possibility
clearly exists of structuring the grand jury according to the individual
prejudices of the presiding judge.
During the past two years, perhaps in response to the criticism that
they have received concerning their selection methods, the San Fran-
cisco Superior Court judges have experimented with variations on this
traditional theme. Prior to the selection of the 1974-75 grand jury,
residents of San Francisco were told through the press that they could
volunteer for grand jury duty and several hundred did so. The court
clerks then randomly selected from this group of volunteers 101 names,
a number equal to the number of persons nominated by the 26 judges.
From the combined groups of 202 persons, the clerks then selected 40
persons who were summoned to the presiding judge's courtroom for
rigorous questioning.2 5 By the luck of the draw 26 of the 40 sum-
moned persons were volunteers, but after the presiding judge's careful
questioning he selected ten persons from among the 14 nominees and
only nine persons from the 26 volunteers to constitute the grand jury.
Despite this seeming manipulation, however, the 1974-75 grand
jury has proved to be unique among San Francisco's recent grand juries
in terms of the intensity of its attacks on the city's highest public offi-
cials. The grand jury's important Committee No. 1, which investigates
the offices of the mayor and the controller, issued a stinging report on
July 28, 1975, accusing Mayor Joseph L. Alioto of apparent conflicts
of interest regarding the finances of the city's port and criticizing his
lack of response in trying to resolve the Sunol Golf Course lease scan-
dal. 26 Mayor Alioto has been a controversial figure for much of his
term in office, but this is the first time any grand jury report has been
critical toward him, 7 and it may be significant that this Committee No.
25. As plaintiffs have argued from the outset of this case, this close judicial ques-
tioning violates California Penal Code section 908, which prescribes selection by lot of
the 19 grand jurors if more than 19 names appear in the final pool. See 378 F. Supp.
at 617 n.16. Although defendants' 1974 "Proposed Rule" may have been designed to
alter this procedure, the questioning has persisted. See 378 F. Supp. 630-31 (Appendix
C).
26. See S.F. Examiner, July 28, 1975, at 1, col 6.
27. More typical comments are those contained in the 1971 grand jury report:
'This committee of the Grand Jury wishes to commend the Mayor, the Honorable Jo-
seph L. Alioto, for the interest, leadership and positive spirit and attitude that he has
demonstrated to the people of San Francisco on so many occasions and in so many ways
to make San Francisco again the city that knows how." 1971 GRAND JURY REPORTS:
CrrY AND CouNTY oF SAN FRANCIscO, CAIxnORmN& 86.
Judge Robert J. Drewes has stated that in the past the grand jury reports have some-
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1 contains three volunteers and only one person nominated by a su-
perior court judge.
28
Presiding Judge Robert J. Drewes, who has the responsibility of
guiding the grand jury through any legal or other difficulties it might
encounter, stated in his deposition that the 1974-75 grand jury has been
"a divided grand jury" with substantial "internal squabbling and dis-
agreement" which has "taken up immeasurable time on my part: Con-
ferences, reconciliations, attempts to work out the difficulties and so
forth."2 9  Judge Drewes stated that he was not aware of all the issues
involved, but he nonetheless attributed the difficulty to the presence
of volunteers on the grand jury.30 Another interpretation could be that
a healthy divergence of opinions existed.
Mayor Alioto's response to the criticism he received from Grand
Jury Committee No. 1 is important and instructive to this litigation. He
stated: "I urge our judges to exercise greater care in determining the
quality, experience, and general intelligence of grand jurors they ap-
point."31  The Mayor's intrusion into the grand jury selection process
is of course wholly improper, because (as is discussed below) this body
is designed to be an independent watchdog on the mayor (and all city
government departments) and should be selected by a process that in-
sulates it from all political pressures.32
In any event, the superior court judges had by the end of January
1975 decided that the "volunteer experiment" had failed, and they be-
gan a second experiment, "the bifurcated jury."33  They created two
times been written by the city department that it is supposed to have been investigating.
See Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 21-22.
28. Keith L. Doerge (Chairman), Albert A. Biagini, and John G. Kamena were
all volunteers; Mrs. Ida May Brown was nominated by Judge Charles S. Peery.
Perhaps it is also significant that Committee No. 15, which issued an equally sting-
ing report condemning Sheriff Richard D. Hongisto's operation (see S.F. Chronicle, July
30, 1974, at 2, col. 6), was composed of two persons nominated by judges and only one
volunteer, because Sheriff Hongisto has long been at odds with most of San Francisco's
other political leaders. George Alferitz, Jr., (Chairman), was a volunteer; Stephen K.
Louis was nominated by Judge Clayton W. Horn (then the presiding judge) and Eliza-
beth Spencer Pfau was nominated by the current presiding judge, Robert J. Drewes.
Foreman George Pagni, who actively supported Alioto in his bid for the Democratic
nomination for governor, unsuccessfully had moved to strike the reference to Alioto's
involvement in the Sunol lease. See S.F. Examiner, Aug, 7, 1975, at 1, col. 5-6.
29. Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 15-16.
30. See id.
31. S.F. Examiner, July 28, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
32. Mayor Alioto, apparently trying to exert further pressure on the current se-
lection process, then wrote a letter to Presiding Judge Drewes calling the 1974-75 grand
jury a "mess and a fiasco." See S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 4, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
33. See id., Jan. 28, 1975, at 5, col. 6 (1st ed.).
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separate grand juries-one to carry out the function of indicting per-
sons charged by the district attorney and the other to investigate and
report on the activities of agencies and government officials in San
Francisco. The judges decided that the "criminal" grand jury should
be selected randomly from the list of registered voters, but that the
"civil" or "investigativ&' grand jury should continue to be a blue-ribbon
panel hand-picked by the judges themselves. The first "indicting"
grand jury was impaneled in March 1975, while the 1974-75 grand jury
described above continued to serve, without any indicting responsibili-
ties, through the summer of 1975.
The selection of the 1975-76 "civil" or "investigative" grand jury
has been through a process even more elaborate and carefully con-
trolled than those of earlier years just described.34 Eighteen of the
judges nominated from three to six persons each to comprise a total
of seventy-nine persons,35 and seven other names were added to the
list, apparently taken from the trial jurors' list, but without explanation.
From these eighty-six names, thirty were summoned as usual to report
to Presiding Judge Drewes's courtroom on July 16, 1975. They were
questioned by Judge Drewes and one of the jury clerks, but the real
and substantial questions of potential conflicts of interest were not pur-
sued. Nominee Alan Nichols stated, for instance, that he had served
on the San Francisco Board of Education and the Library Committee
of San Francisco, as well as on many state commissions and federal
boards. He further stated that his law firm is representing a client be-
ing sued by the City of San Francisco for payment of rent at the San
Francisco port, and that he personally was a legal and financial counsel
for a nonprofit corporation that was asked by the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors to prepare a development program for the port. Mr.
34. The events described in this section have been compiled on the basis of per-
sonal observations, see affidavit of Jon Van Dyke, supra.
35. The nominees for the 1975-76 grand jury contained an unusually high number
of former public officials, including three former members of the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors (Roger Boas, Harold Dobbs, and Clarissa McMahon) and three former
office holders (Caroline Charles, former Housing Authority chairwoman; Sam Ladar,
former police commissioner, and Alan Nichols, former president of the Board of Educa-
tion). S.F. Chronicle, July 1, 1975, at 29, col. 1.
The presence of such persons on the grand jury would certainly increase the poten-
tial for conflicts of interest and-because of continued political ties between the nom-
inees and current office-holders--reduce the independence of the grand jury and trans-
form it into simply another political body. As will be discussed more fully below, the
grand jury has played such an important role in our country's history because it has been
removed from the centers of power and has been able to take a truly independent exam-
ination of the operations of government.
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Nichols thus has intimate and personal connection with the major prob-
lem areas that the 1975-76 grand jury will face. The presiding judge,
nonetheless, did not pursue any of these inquiries and did not excuse
Mr. Nichols, whom he had personally nominated.
Twelve other of the original thirty persons whose names were
drawn were, however, excused on that first day of questioning for rea-
sons, according to the presiding judge, "that appear in the record,"3
but which have not been publicly or individually explained. The pre-
siding judge then instructed the clerk to draw twelve new names from
the drum and ordered the twelve to report to the courthouse the follow-
ing Tuesday, July 22. After these potential jurors were questioned,
Judge Drewes excused seven, asked his clerk to draw seven new
names, and ordered them to report nine days later, on July 31. These
seven were then questioned, four were excused-again without expla-
nation-and two persons who had been previously summoned were
also excused. Six new names were then drawn. On August 5, this
process was repeated once again-the six persons summoned to the
presiding judge's courtroom (plus one who had been previously drawn
but had been vacationing in Europe) were briefly questioned, five were
excused and five new names were drawn. The next episode is
scheduled for August 14.
37
The presiding judge's careful efforts to inpanel a grand jury ac-
cording to his own particular tastes is unique to plaintiffs' knowledge
and certainly undercuts any independence the grand jury might other-
wise have. The fact that a large number of defeated local politicians
and a significant number of the presiding judge's personal nominees
may sit on the forthcoming grand jury smacks of old-fashioned cronyism
that has no place in the selection of a body whose job it is to guarantee
honest and efficient government.38  The "opportunity to discriminate"
that this court worried about in its earlier opinion in this case" has thus
substantially increased in the procedures used in 1975, and the San
Francisco Grand Jury is in danger of becoming a body filled with unem-
36. [Notes of Jon Van Dyke, dated July 16, 1975 (on file in Professor Van Dyke's
office).]
37. [The selection was still in process when this motion was filed.]
38. It should also be observed that at least one person whom the presiding judge
nominated in previous years, Richard 0. Herman (who married one of Judge Drewes's
close friends 25 years ago) was nominated in 1975-76 by Judge Henry R. Rolph, thus
perhaps increasing Judge Drewes's personal control over the grand jury. One of Judge
Rolph's other nominees, Clarissa McMahon, was-like two of Judge Drewes's nominees
(and like Judge Rolph himself)-a former member of the San Francisco Board of Super-
visors.
39. See 378 F. Supp. at 617.
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ployed local politicians who are appointed to this high position by
former political associates who have become superior court judges.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
No real dispute remains concerning whether this new "civil" or
"investigative" jury will be representative. It will not be. Defendants,
however, argue that because they have taken away the grand jury's in-
dicting function they need no longer hew to nondiscriminatory selection
procedures. In deciding to continue the personal-selection blue-ribbon
approach, defendants have narrowed the issue to be resolved to a ques-
tion that might be phrased as follows:
Can a grand jury whose functions include investigating
and issuing reports on all city agencies and officials, with
power to obtain information that is virtually unlimited and
with the ultimate power of impeaching any public official,
be selected in a manner that would be deemed unconstitu-
tional if the grand jury had the additional task of indicting
persons accused of criminal activity?
To plaintiffs' knowledge, no county in the United States has ever "bi-
furcated" its grand jury in this manner, and so this case in a sense pre-
sents a question of first impression. The novelty and importance of
this question does not, however, render its resolution difficult. Clearly
articulated legal standards of nondiscrimination that have been applied
repeatedly to grand jury selections apply equally to this novel institu-
tion, because the grand jury's role has always been primarily to investi-
gate and because its power to obtain information requires that this
power be given only to a body truly representative of the community.
Plaintiffs will explain the legal principles and the policies behind them
in depth to indicate why our traditional commitment to representative
grand juries must be maintained if the citizens of San Francisco are
to have a grand jury that can function free from political influence, bias,
or manipulation. Only such an independent grand jury will be able
to expose the graft, corruption, and inefficiency that pose a danger to
all local governments.
ARGUMENT
I. The Constitutional Standards Governing Grand Jury
Selection Are No Different for a Grand Jury De-
scribed as "Civil" or "Investigative." The Constitu-
tion Requires That All Grand Juries Be Truly Repre-
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sentative and Independent. For All the Years Under
Attack, the San Francisco Grand Jury Has Never
Satisfied The Constitutional Standard and as Such
Has Consistently Been Unconstitutional.
A. The United States Supreme Court Has Consistently
Required That the Grand Jury Must Be "A Body
Truly Representative of the Community."
For at least the past thirty-five years, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently required that the grand jury must be "a body
truly representative of the community," 40 and the Court has repeatedly
held that all juries and grand juries must be selected by means that
ensure that a cross-section of the community will be represented on the
panel.
41
In its earlier opinion in this case, this court ruled that where the
"opportunity to discriminate" is clear, as it certainly is under this selec-
tion process, it is proper to examine statistics alone to see whether a
prima facie case of discrimination has been established. If those statis-
tics indicate a substantial underrepresentation over a period of time,
then the burden shifts to the government to explain that underrepre-
sentation.42 These principles derive from cases arising from selection
schemes in the South, where local officials using discretionary selection
systems produced juries that underrepresented non-Whites year after
year.
43
The San Francisco grand jury selection process is susceptible to
abuse in just the same manner as were the Georgia, Alabama, and
Louisiana systems discussed in Turner v. Fouche,44 Carter v. Jury Com-
mission,45 and Alexander v. Louisiana.46 In fact, the San Francisco
selection system contains more opportunities to discriminate, because
possibilities for abuse exist at both the nominating stage and the final
selection stage. The San Francisco judges not only inevitably discover
the race, sex, occupation, and age of their nominees, they in fact choose
40. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940), quoted in Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
41. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
42. 378 F. Supp. at 613-15.
43. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
44. [396 U.S. 346 (1970).]
45. [396 U.S. 320 (1970).]
46. [405 U.S. 625 (1972).]
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these characteristics, making the potential for bias even greater. The
statistics gathered together in Appendix A show a significant underrep-
resentation not only in the racial categories discussed in Turner, Carter,
and Alexander, but also in categories of sex, age, and economic status.
The burden of explanation thus shifts to the defendants in all of these
categories, a burden that the defendants cannot sustain. Rather, Pre-
siding Judge Robert J. Drewes has agreed with plaintiffs that mem-
bers of underrepresented groups would be just as competent to serve as
grand jurors as those now selected to serve.47
B. "Civil" Juries Are Held to the Identical Constitutional
Standards as Criminal Juries. Defendants' Assertion
That a Different Constitutional Standard Applies
Is Totally Without Support.
The United States Supreme Court has always required the same
standard of cross-representation in the selection of "civil" juries as in
the selection of "criminal" juries, 48 and no reason in logic or experience
would justify a different standard for the two. All juries and grand
juries are designed to bring the common sense of ordinary citizens into
the judicial decision-making process in order to insulate this decision-
making from the political forces that control other branches of govern-
ment.
In Carter v. Jury Commission, the United States Supreme Court
pointed out that "[o]nce the State chooses to provide grand . . . juries,
whether or not constitutionally required to do so, it must hew to federal
constitutional criteria in ensuring that the selection of membership is
free of racial [and other] bias."' 49  The Court indicated clearly that
this standard applies to all grand juries, no matter what functions they
perform, although recognizing that a state can use its grand juries to
undertake a wide variety of responsibilities.
C. Most Grand Juries Today Are Primarily Investigative
Bodies. Nonetheless No Different or Lower Constitutional
Standard Has Ever Been Applied or Permitted To Stand.
Defendants' attempt to avoid impaneling a representative grand jury
by creating a "civil" or "investigative" grand jury and then arguing
47. See Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 32, 37.
48. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
49. 396 U.S. at 330 (footnote omitted).
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that a different standard applies to such a body must be based on a
fundamental misunderstanding about grand juries.
Grand juries have always been primarily investigative bodies.
The first grand juries were established solely to perform investigative
functions.50 Many states (and the federal system) do use grand juries
for the purpose of indicting the criminally accused, but the investigating
role has always been important.51  Over half the states in the United
States now bring most criminal charges by means of an information and
a preliminary hearing, and limit the use of the grand jury to those mat-
ters that require extensive investigation and a greater-than-usual need
to obtain private information."' California was, of course, one of the
50. The first grand juries were those established in the 11th century by William
the Conqueror, who summoned townspeople from all parts of England to answer ques-
tions under oath in order to compile information that could be used for various admin-
istrative purposes, including the compilation of the Domesday Book, the first modem
census. See Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigative Body, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 590
(1961).
51. The non-prosecutorial grand jury report was utilized with particular impact
during the years when the grand jury began to develop as an instrument against
despotism. In 1683, for instance, a Chester grand jury report (without an indictment)
charged certain Whigs, including the Earl of Macclesfield, with seditious and disloyal
conduct. A libel suit followed, in which the defense argued that "it is the constant uni-
versal practice" of grand juries to report to the court on any matters concerning the busi-
ness of the county, and that if the grand jury learned of any national danger, their oath
bound them to make "prudent and discreet representations of their fears, and the grounds
and reasons of them." The court found for the defense without issuing an opinion, thus
upholding the propriety of grand jury reports. See Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment,"
55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (1955), citing Proceedings between Charles Earl of Mac-
clesfield and John Starkey, Esq., 10 How. St. Tr. 1330.
English grand juries in the 17th and 18th centuries also issued reports criticizing
constables and justices for abusive market practices, assessing the supervision by justices
of houses of correction, and commenting on "the improper care of bridges, gaols, high-
ways, and other county property, and on justices of the peace who accepted excessive
fees." In 1697, an Essex County grand jury criticized a county coroner for "vexing"
a coroner's jury that failed to follow his direction regarding a verdict. See id., at 1109-
10, citing S. & B. WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
MUNICIPAL CORPOAnONs ACT: THE PARISH AND THE CouNT 448-56 (1906).
The grand jury report was also in common use in the American colonies, where
it was common practice for grand juries to express their opinions on governmental ad-
ministration. See SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 70-71 (1930). Grand
juries in colonial New Jersey criticized the county government for failure to keep bridges
and highways in repair, failure to provide a prison, and neglect of regulating weights
and measures, among other things. See In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23,
41-43, 89 A.2d 416, 427-28 (1952).
52. The states that no longer require a grand jury indictment to initiate a criminal
proceeding include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
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first states to move in this direction,5 and California grand juries have,
for decades been primarily "investigative."
This alteration in the role of the grand jury has not, however, de-
prived the ancient institution of its importance. Indeed, the freeing
of the grand jury from the sometimes humdrum task of passing on
every person criminally accused has given this body the time needed
to investigate those more serious problems of official wrongdoing that
have plagued our governments local and national.54 Colorado and
Wyoming now view the grand jury as such a useful investigating body
that those states have passed legislation authorizing statewide grand
juries to be impaneled to examine wrongdoings that transcend county
borders. 5 The United States Congress also recognized the importance
of grand jury investigations in the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act,
when it greatly expanded the types of grand juries that could be im-
paneled and broadened the grand jury's information-gathering power.56
Judge Byron Arnold, when he was presiding judge supervising the
1972 San Francisco Grand Jury, also recognized the paramount im-
portance of the investigations conducted by grand juries. When asked
what he considered the most important function of the grand jury
(which then, of course, had an indicting responsibility as well) he re-
Wyoming. Four other states (Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, and Vermont) require
a grand jury indictment only for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment.
[I. Van Dyke, Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Juries (book scheduled to
be published in Fall, 1976).]
53. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
54. One commentator described these investigations as follows: "Mhe grand
jury is independent and can make investigations on its own motion. Hence, organized
crime can be combatted, and investigations into areas where prosecutors, -for one reason
or another, are unwilling to look, can be made. Here the grand jury has scored notable
success in ridding communities of vice and racketeering that was intermingled with of-
ficial corruption. In 1933 an Atlanta grand jury in the face of court opposition cleaned
up a rotten situation involving county commissioners. The same year a Cleveland grand
jury exposed a degenerate police and prosecution system. The 1935 exposure of vice
and policy rackets in New York by a special grand jury is well known. And in 1937-
38, a Philadelphia grand jury was responsible for the ultimate correction of widespread
police misconduct." Whyte, Is the Grand lury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. RLrv. 461, 486
(1959) (emphasis added). See also In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 NJ. 23, 89
A.2d 416 (1952) (describing the revealing investigations undertaken by the Essex
County, New Jersey, grand jury); R. HuGHs, ATrORNBY FOR Th PEOPLE: THu STORY
oF THo.ms E. DEwEY (1940); Konowitz, The Grand Jury as an Investigating Body of
Public Officials, 10 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 219 (1936) (describing the important investiga-
tions of the New York City grand jury).
55. See CoLO. RLnv. STAT. §§ 13-73-101 to -108 (1973); WYO. STAT. 7-117.8
(Supp. 1975).
56. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-34 (1970).
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sponded that the most important responsibility "is the investigation and
inquiry into the operation and management of our various departments
of the government. It is the only body of citizens that has the right
to inquire into the operations and functions of the City departments."
Grand jurors can affect our lives, he concluded, "[b]y seeing to it that
our elected officials are carrying out the duties of their offices, faith-
fully, honestly, intelligently. I guess that would be the main thing that
they could do."' 57 The grand jurors are, of course, more likely to fulfill
this responsibility if they are selected by a process that ensures their
impartiality and independence from city government, i.e., a process that
conforms to the constitutional requirements of nondiscrimination that
apply to all grand juries and trial juries.
II. The Investigating Power of the Grand Jury and
the Important Interests It Is Supposed To Protect
and Vindicate Show the Compelling and Substantial
Need for an Investigative Grand Jury That Is "A
Body Truly Representative of the Community."
The grand jury, especially when performing an investigative func-
tion, is an institution through which citizens actively participate in the
system of checks and balances that is the touchstone of our democracy.
It is a unique body, empowering citizens to investigate whether our
public officials are really working for the public interest. The grand
jury can and does investigate the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government to uncover graft, corruption, inefficiency, and
any other abuses of power. Only if the public is broadly represented
on the grand jury-and only if the selection process insulates the grand
jury from political pressure sufficiently to protect its independence-
can we be sure that this powerful body will act in the public interest.
Senator Wayne Morse, when he was a professor of law at the Uni-
versity of Oregon, published an extensive study of the grand jury that
examined in detail the pros and cons of various selection methods.
5 8
Senator Morse emphasized the grand jury's investigations of govern-
mental corruption and found that:
The grand jury always exists in the background as a possible check
on any officer or group of officers who fail to keep faith with the
public. One Oregon judge put it, "I would hate to see the grand
57. Judge Arnold's deposition, supra note 12, at 8 (emphasis added).
58. See Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (pts. 1-2), 10 ORE. L. RFv.
101, 217, 295 (1931).
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jury abolished as the fear of grand jury investigations no doubt
holds down much fraud and corruption in local government." 59
Senator Morse interviewed hundreds of judges throughout the country,
and it is significant that 40 percent of those interviewed favored a com-
pletely random method over any other method, even at a time when
most jurisdictions were hand-picking both grand jurors and trial jurors.
Senator Morse explained why so many judges preferred the random
selection method as follows:
Some of the 187 judges who favored the selection of grand jurors
purely by lot supported their position with arguments to the effect
that such a method is free of political favors and places an equal
obligation on all qualified voters to assume their civic responsibil-
ities. Then, too, many of them expressed the belief that the gen-
eral public has greater confidence in the decisions of a jury that
does not owe its appointment to individuals who might possibly be
interested in and affected by the evidence considered by the jury.
In the words of one judge, "Hand-picked grand juries are of little
value in investigating political fraud and municipal corruption. If
selected by an official who is a member of the political group being
investigated, the public will not have faith in them and often justi-
fiably so. If selected by an official on the other side, there is the
danger that spite and politics may dominate the grand jury ac-
tions."60
The reasoning of these judges clearly applies to San Francisco too: San
Franciscans are entitled to and need a grand jury that will investigate
government graft, corruption, and efficiency without bias or manipula-
tion, and only a grand jury freed from all political influence can per-
form such a function.
A major reason why the grand jury has continued to be viewed
as such a useful institution is that it has a unique power to obtain evi-
dence. Grand juries have an authority to demand answers from gov-
ernment officials and private citizens that goes far beyond the power
given to any other law enforcement body The constitutional privileges
and protections that can be asserted to avoid responding to the inquiries
of the police, the FBI, or any other law enforcement body do not shield
one from a grand jury inquiry. In 1972 the United States Supreme
Court stated that "the longstanding principle that 'the public has a right
to every man's evidence' . . . is particularly applicable to grand jury
proceedings,""' and in 1974 the Court applied that rule to the president
of the United States.
59. Id. at 233-34.
60. Id. at 237-38 (emphasis added).
61. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
62. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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Statutes in California similarly give local grand juries broad au-
thorization to conduct investigations and to demand information. The
basic power to subpoena information is given to the grand jury in Penal
Code section 939.2.63 Through this statutory grant, the grand jury is
empowered to institute and initiate inquiries as it deems appropriate
and to obtain any and all information necessary to resolve its con-
cerns. 64  Persons called before the grand jury-including the persons
under investigation-are obliged to testify and "can claim only the priv-
ilege protecting a witness from self-incrimination." '6
California Penal Code section 92566 instructs county grand juries
to inspect all county records, especially fiscal records, and a 1973
amendment 67 extends this power to the records of cities within the
county. 68 The grand jury is also assigned the duty of investigating and
63. CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.2 (West Supp. 1975).
64. In re Peart, 5 Cal. App. 2d 469, 473, 43 P.2d 334, 336 (1935).
65. In re McDonough, 21 Cal. App. 2d 287, 288, 68 P.2d 1020, 1020-21 (1937),
aff'd, 9 Cal. 2d 90, 68 P.2d 1021 (1937). See also In re Hoertkorn, 15 Cal. App. 2d
93, 96, 59 P.2d 218, 219 (1936); In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 82, 91, 59 P.2d 213,
217 (1936).
An example of the grand jury's power to subpoena information can be seen by ex-
amining the case of Samish v. Superior Ct., 28 Cal. App. 2d 685, 83 P.2d 305 (1938).
The Sacramento County Grand Jury had begun an investigation of bribery and corrupt
lobbying practices in the state legislature, and issued a subpoena duces tecum to Arthur
Samish, ordering him to appear before the grand jury with copies of his federal and state
tax returns for the years 1935, 1936 and 1937. Samish was a lobbyist in Sacramento,
and was thought to be one of the most powerful men in the state. He petitioned for
a writ of prohibition, not on self-incrimination grounds, but rather on the grounds that
the tax returns were confidential.
The court of appeal denied the writ, and upheld the authority of the grand jury:
"A grand jury is not deprived of jurisdiction to investigate asserted public offenses
merely because its members are uncertain as to whether a crime was actually committed
or because of a lack of identity of the particular individual who perpetrated the
crime." Id. at 689.
The investigation being proper, the court held that the grand jury had the power
to compel Samish to disclose his income tax information in the absence of an assertion
of the self-incrimination privilege. The confidentiality of tax returns applied only to
the originals in the hands of the tax officials, and not to copies in the hands of the
petitioner. See id. at 693.
The grand jury in California thus seems to have almost unlimited authority to pur-
sue information within its statutory realm of authority, and that realm is itself virtually
unlimited.
66. CAL. PEN. CODE § 925 (West Supp. 1975).
67. See id. § 925a.
68. Section 925 has been broadly interpreted by the attorney general's office to
permit the grand jury to examine the records of school service funds and immigration
districts. See 30 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 125 (1957); see 15 Op. CAL. ArT'Y GEN. 151
(1950).
California grand juries also have the power to investigate sales and transfers of land
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reporting on the needs of all county officers, "including the abolition
or creation of officers and the equipment for, or the method or system
of performing the duties of, the several offices."69  Grand juries im-
paneled in even-numbered years are assigned the duty of investigating
the "needs for increase or decrease in salaries of the county . . .dis-
trict attorney, and the auditor."7 The grand jury may also investigate
the need for an increase in the salaries of members of the board of
supervisors "as often as may be required ....
Penal Code section 919 assigns still another important responsibil-
ity to California's grand juries. Subsection (a) provides for the investi-
which might escheat to the state (CAL. PEN. CODE § 920 (West 1970)), and can order the
district attorney to "institute suit to recover any money that, in the judgment of the
grand jury, may from any cause be due the county." CAL. PEN. CODE § 923 (West
1970).
69. CAL. PEN. CODE § 928 (West 1970).
70. Id. § 927 (West Supp. 1975).
71. Id. § 927. These statutory sections indicate that California's grand juries
have the power to pick almost any topic for investigation, and in fact our county grand
juries have roamed across the entire spectrum of possible topics in their recent investiga-
tions. One recent commentator has summarized some of the topics investigated by
California grand juries in the 1960's as follows:
"In the area of education, for example, two consecutive grand juries in Sacramento
County looked into and opposed the Sacramento City Schools' plans for school desegre-
gation. Alameda County's 1965 grand jury studied student disorders at the University
of California's Berkeley campus and made a series of recommendations calling for the
University administration to take tougher action to prevent use of the campus for unlaw-
ful activities. This investigation into the conduct of a state agency was approved in ad-
vance by the Alameda County Superior Court and justified on the grounds that student
disturbances on and off campus placed a burden on the county's law enforcement agen-
cies and court system, and thus was a proper exercise of the grand jury's duty to inquire
into the needs and operations of county government. Also in the field of education,
grand juries have recommended that instruction in 'Citizenship and Law Enforcement'
be included in the high school curriculum, that health and sex education classes be insti-
tuted to arrest the 'alarming' rate of venereal disease, that high school counselors place
more emphasis on vocational education, that a teacher recruitment program be instituted,
and that a study be conducted on innovations in the teaching of social sciences.
"In other fields, grand juries urged that the county hospital be closed and indigents
cared for through contract with private hospitals, that job training programs for welfare
recipients be expanded, that day care nurseries be expanded to allow welfare recipients
to accept employment, that a child adoption service be established, that more effective
programs be planned to treat alcoholics, that family planning services in poverty areas
be improved, and that a program for purchase and development of park facilities be im-
plemented. One grand jury urged a complete overhaul of rules, regulations, financial
controls and administration of welfare programs and an immediate moratorium on 'any
additional welfare liberalization.'
"A major topic for many grand juries was the rising use of drugs and narcotics
among young people. One grand jury conducted a public hearing, after which it stated
its intention to make the problem of illegal drug use its first order of business, other
grand juries made recommendations ranging from a compulsory drug education program
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gation of the case of "every person imprisoned in the jail of the county
on a criminal charge and not indicted." Subsection (b) directs the
panel to inquire into the condition and management of prisons within
the county. Perhaps most significant, however, is subsection (c),
which provides for the investigation of "willful or corrupt misconduct
in office of public officers of every description within the county."'72
How these delicate inquiries are undertaken will obviously depend
on the composition of the grand jury. If the grand jurors are hand-
picked by the judges, who frequently obtain their jobs because of close
contact with other public officials, then they are substantially less likely
to investigate carefully the acts of those public officials. The grand
jurors would be tempted to turn away from misconduct for fear of em-
barrassing those who nominated them for the grand jury position. This
result is particularly likely when the judges obtain their nominees from
persons currently in public office, as when the presiding judge forwards
the recommendations of members of the board of supervisors. 73 If the
judges nominate persons who have served in public office previously,
as many did for the 1975-76 grand jury, then the grand jurors will have
important links with the very officials they are supposed to investigate.
Not only will the possibility of partiality or outside manipulation be
high, but the appearance of fairness essential to the effectiveness of
this ancient institution will be missing. The matter is especially im-
portant in an era of absence of confidence in government and the politi-
cal process.
The necessity for an absolutely impartial and independent grand
jury is finally driven home by Government Code section 3060, which
vests in the grand jury an impeachment function. That section pro-
vides: "An accusation in writing against any officer of a district,
county, or city, including any member of the governing board of a
school district, for wilful or corrupt misconduct in office, may be pre-
sented by the grand jury of the county for or in which the officer ac-
cused is elected or appointed. An accusation may not be presented
without the concurrence of at least 12 grand jurors."74 When such an
accusation is made, it is to be delivered to the district attorney, 75 who
shall have a copy served upon the defendant, along with a notice to
in the schools to the development of a central county agency for narcotics information."
Mar, The California Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy, 1 PAC. L.J. 36, 62-63 (1970)
(footnote omitted).
72. CAL. PEN. CODE § 919 (West 1970).
73. See Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 6.
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3060 (West 1966).
75. Id. § 3062 (West 1966).
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appear in superior court.76 The defendant is provided a trial by jury,
77
and upon conviction is removed from office. 78
Although this procedure has seldom been used in recent years,
it is certainly a powerful tool for the grand jury to have at its disposal.
Section 3060 of the Government Code has been construed broadly by
the courts: "The main purpose of the accusation .. .is to remove a
person from office for misconduct in such office; the misconduct charge
need not necessarily include an act which would itself constitute a
crime, and if it does include a crime the judgment on accusation would
not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for such crime." 79  "The
phrase 'misconduct in office' is broad enough to include any willful mal-
feasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office."80  Under this statu-
76. Id. § 3063.
77. Id. § 3070.
78. Id. § 3072. Because this clause gives the grand jury only the power to begin
a procedure leading to the removal of a public official from office, rather than to the
imposition of a criminal conviction, and because the accusation need not be based on
any criminal violation (see note 80 infra), one must assume that this power remains
with the "civil" or "investigative" grand jury rather than being assigned to the "criminal"
or "indicting" grand jury.
79. In re Burleigh, 145 Cal. 35, 37, 78 P. 242, 243 (1904). See also People v.
Harby, 51 Cal. App. 2d 759, 767, 125 P.2d 874, 877-78 (1942); Reid v. Superior Ct.j
44 Cal. App. 349, 356, 186 P. 634, 637 (1919).
80. Coffey v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. 525, 529, 82 P. 75, 76 (1905), citing State
ex rel. Tilley v. Slover, 113 Mo. 202, 208, 20 S.W. 788, 789 (1892). See People v.
Elliott, 115 Cal. App. 2d 410, 420, 252 P.2d 661, 667 (1953). "[Tjhe phrase 'wilful
or corrupt misconduct in office' does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal inten-
tion. It means 'simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act;'--'a wrongful design
to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the person guilty of the act."'
People v. Becker, 112 Cal. App. 2d 324, 326, 246 P.2d 103, 104 (1952), quoting CAL.
PPN. CODE § 7(1), (3) (West 1970). All that is required is "a purpose or willingness
to commit the proscribed act or to be guilty of the omission." People v. Hale, 232 Cal.
App. 2d 112, 118-19, 42 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537, (1965), citing In re Burleigh, 145 Cal.
35, 37, 78 P. 242, 243 (1904); People v. Elliott, 115 Cal. App. 2d 410, 414, 252 P.2d
874, 878 (1953); People v. Becker, 112 Cal. App. 2d 324, 326, 246 P.2d 103, 104
(1952); People v. Harby, 51 Cal. App. 2d 759, 767, 125 P.2d 874, 878 (1942). "The
official doing of a wrongful act, or official neglect to do an act which ought to have
been done, will constitute the offense although there was no corrupt or malicious mo-
tive." Coffey v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. 525, 529, 82 P. 75, 76 (1905). Thus, "it is
not necessary that the accused committed the acts or omissions charged with an intent
to commit misconduct. Nor is it necessary that the accused knew that the acts or omis-
sions charged constituted misconduct in office." People v. Mullin, 197 Cal. App. 2d
479, 486, 17 Cal. Rptr. 516, 519-20 (1961).
"In summary, if an official commits a crime in connection with the operation of
his office, or wilfully or corruptly fails or refuses to carry out a duty prescribed by law
or by the charter, if any, under which he holds his position, or if his conduct as such
officer is below the standard of decency rightfully expected of a public official such as
drunkenness during work hours or a gross and repeated failure to carry out his official
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tory authority, the appellate courts have upheld the removal from office
of a sheriff who willfully refused to investigate a complaint of child
molestation, 81 and school officials for conflict of interest."2
Because of this unique power to bring about the removal of an
official elected by the public or appointed by an elected official, it is
important that the grand jury be broadly representative of the com-
munity. If the panel represents only the narrow segment of the com-
munity that holds political power, it may tolerate situations where offi-
cials serve the needs of that one interest group, but otherwise fail to
fulfill their obligations to the public. In fact, one can speculate that
the reason this provision has been so infrequently used in recent years
may perhaps be related to the selection procedure that fills the grand
jury with persons who are acquaintances of those in power whom they
are supposed to investigate.
Even the most high minded and honorable persons have biases,
preferences, and subconscious concerns, and these subconscious con-
cerns will be enlarged if the grand jurors have had extensive prior per-
sonal contact with those they are empowered to investigate. Grand
jurors who are past members of the board of supervisors or who have
held other political offices are unlikely to be as aggressive as they might
be in probing the agencies of city government, if the former officials
are still allied to those currently in power; if they are at odds with those
currently in political office they may use their position on the grand
jury for partisan political ends. The public would lose in either situa-
tion. Plaintiffs insist that it is essential that each and every grand juror
be free from all potential conflicts of interest in order to ensure the
independence of the grand jury. The present selection system leads
to the opposite result.
III. The Interests Defendants Advance To Justify a
Blue-Ribbon Grand Jury Are neither Compelling
nor Substantial; Therefore the Personal Selection
System Has No Adequate Justification and Must Be
Changed to a System Conforming to Constitutional
Standards.
routine in a timely and appropriate manner, he may be removed from his office as the
result of an accusation. Such misconduct in office may be corrupt or merely wilful."
People v. Hale, 232 Cal. App. 2d 112, 119, 42 Cal. Rptr. 533, 538 (1965); 2 B. WrrKiN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 874, at 820-21 (1963).
81. See People v. Mullin, 197 Cal. App. 2d 479, 17 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1961).
82. See People v. Elliott, 115 Cal. App. 2d 410, 252 P.2d 661 (1953); People v.
Becker, 112 Cal. App. 2d 324, 246 P.2d 103 (1952).
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Presiding Judge Robert J. Drewes gave the following explanation
of why he prefers a blue-ribbon panel for his "civil" or "investigative"
grand jury when his deposition wastaken:
QUESTION: Do you have any view as to whether the investi-
gative grand jury ought to be .... a so-called blue ribbon grand
jury, in -the sense of possessing a higher or special level of skills
or expertise as opposed to being a cross-section or representative
grand jury, if those two should conflict?
JUDGE DREWES: Yes, yes. I think it should be composed of
highly qualified persons who have the time and the interest to do
the job. In other words, I don't think a randomly selected grand
jury would be able to function on the civil side of its responsibili-
ties, because I don't think you'd have the time. I think the court
would be continuously faced with the problem of keeping a quorum
functioning, and I base that simplyonmy experience with the trial
jurors.
QUESTION: Would you have any problems with the notion of
a randomly selected pool "of grand jurors which was then narrowed
down by whether or not the person. had the time and inclination
to serve?
JUDGE DREWES: I don't think they'd have the requisite experi-
ence to do so, the knowledge to enable it-let me put it this way.
Over the years, the grand jury has been severely criticized because
it simply wasn't able to do the job that is required of it by statute.
In fact, to the point where on many occasions the report that is
required of them about the agency being investigated has been
written by the executives of the agency.
QUESTION: We are familiar with a few examples of that.
JUDGE DREWES; That is the sort of thing that led me to the
conclusion that a better job would be done for the County if per-
sons qualified by experience and -training.to do the job were put
in that position.
8 3
Judge Drewes's perspective on this issue is not a novel one. Rather
it is the perspective that the San Francisco Superior Court judges have
been acting upon for many years in trying to select their grand jurors.
The Honorable Byron Arnold, the presiding judge in 1972, articulated
a similar view when his deposition was taken:
QUESTION: You were quoted in an interview from a reporter
in the San Francisco Chronicle on September 20, 1972, in connec-
tion with the filing of this case as- saying, and I am quoting from
the report in that newspaper, "We don't want people from the voter
lists or the telephone book. We should have the finest, most ca-
pable people that it's possible to get. They should be a cross section
of the better elements of the community." You, in fact, made that
statement?
83. Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 21-22.
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JUDGE ARNOLD: Yes. That's exactly my philosophy on the
subject.
QUESTION: What did you mean by the comment that the Grand
Jurors represented a cross section of the better elements of the com-
munity?
JUDGE ARNOLD: The better elements of the community so far
as the Grand Jury is concerned. So far as I am concerned and
mean is that they were to have an interest in our society and in
our community life, and have a desire to do what they can toward
bettering that civil situation.
8 4
These statements are the only arguments that defendants have
thus far offered to sustain the burden of explanation imposed upon
them by the prima facie case of discrimination that plaintiffs have dem-
onstrated. 5 These explanations are, however, wholly inadequate and
themselves show the inherent biases and manipulation of the present
selection scheme. The defendants have assumed that it is proper for
them to determine what needs to be investigated and how that investi-
gation should be conducted. The legislature, however, envisioned the
grand jury as an independent body that would formulate its own plans
for investigation, and this has been the historical reason why this an-
cient institution has been preserved through the centuries.
Defendants furthermore seem to be erecting a requirement of
some professional education and high level of intelligence as a mini-
mum standard of qualification for grand jury service. Educational
qualifications of this sort are not, however, neutral in our society, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has specifically
condemned tests that measure more than average intelligence."6
American history contains many examples of independent grand
juries that have confronted and exposed governmental corruption, and
many other examples of docile, controlled grand juries that have sat
idly by while elected officials enriched themselves at the expense of
the public. In most of the colonies of pre-1776 North America, jurors
and grand jurors were hand-picked by the sheriff, who was hand-picked
by the British Crown, and as a result only the largest landholders be-
came members of these largely docile bodies.8 7 In Virginia, however,
84. Judge Arnold's deposition, supra note 12, at 38 (emphasis added).
85. For another phrasing of this argument, see Quadra v. Superior Ct., 378 F.
Supp. 605, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
86. See Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 929 (1972), cited in Quadra v. Superior Ct., 378 F. Supp. 605, 616 n.14 (N.D.
Cal. 1974).
87. See, e.g., R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE
UNrrED STATES 5 (1963).
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the grand jurors were selected in a more random fashion, 'and these
more independent grand jurors frequently made unusually probing and
embarrassing examinations of governmental activities. The Royal
Governor, Francis Nicholson, became upset at this activity and issued
a proclamation in 1690 (somewhat akin to the order involved in this
case) instructing the local sheriffs to select grand jurors only "from the
most substantial inhabitants of your cities."188 Nine years later, the Vir-
ginia General Assembly defined more particularly the requirements for
jury service, saying that jurors in the General Court must be freehold-
ers whose real and personal property are visibly of the reputed value
of 100 pounds sterling.s These decrees substantially ended the inde-
pendence of the Virginia juries and reduced the potential for embar-
rassment to the Crown.
In the colony of Massachusetts, the sheriff originally selected all
grand jurors, but in the early 18th century the colonists were able to
wrest away the sheriff's power and instead gave that power to the town
meetings held in all communities. This change became particularly
important during the turbulent years before the American Revolution.
When the Royal Governor asked the grand jury to investigate the fre-
quent disturbances connected with anti-British activity, the colonists
were able to thwart the investigation by selecting as grand jurors per-
sons who had played leading roles in the disturbances.9" After the
Boston Tea Party of 1773, the British House of Commons passed an
elaborate statute called the Port Bill revising local government in
Massachusetts and requiring that the King's Sheriff choose grand jurors
and trial jurors from a list of freeholders. This move was protested
vehemently and the few token persons opposing the British rule who
were selected for the grand jury-men like Paul Revere and John Han-
cock's brother Ebenezer-refused to take their oaths as grand jurors.91
But to find examples of the importance of the independent and
impartial jury, we need not look into such distant history nor beyond
the borders of our own community. San Francisco has in the past suf-
fered from corrupt government that should have been exposed by a
vigilant grand jury. Instead, because our grand jurors are hand se-
lected by the judges, who frequently have close ties to elected and ap-
pointed officials, many abuses have persisted without investigation.
88. Id. at 10.
89. I1 LAws OF VIRGINIA 175-76 (W. Hening ed. 1823).
90. j. MILLER, ORGiNs oF THE AmERIcAN REvoLrior 286-87 (1959).
91. R. YouNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JuRY IN' THE UNITnD .STATES
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Consider the situation that existed in the first decade of this cen-
tury. In 1901 persons in the labor movement decided to seek control
of the San Francisco municipal government under the banner of the
Union Labor Party. A North Beach Republican named Abraham
Ruef, who had been frustrated in his attempts to gain control of the
Republican organization in the city, decided to take a hand in the for-
mation of the new party. Ruef's tightly-disciplined operatives easily
infiltrated and gained control of the new party structure and secured
the nomination of Musicians' Union President Eugene Schmitz for
mayor. Schmitz received a plurality of the votes in a three-way contest,
and Ruef quickly became the power behind the throne, gradually in-
stalling persons loyal to him in official positions. Ruef held no office
himself, but was nonetheless the pivotal figure in an elaborate graft
scheme. Persons and corporations who needed the cooperation of the
city government would pay "attorney's fees" to Ruef, who would then
see that their interests were catered to, sometimes sharing his fee with
various officials. Schmitz was re-elected twice, and in the 1905 elec-
tion, Ruef's entire slate was victorious. 92
The city's newspapers had by this time become increasingly vocif-
erous in their denunciations of municipal corruption, but their protests
were to little avail, partly because San Francisco's grand juries for much
of Schmitz's tenure were subservient to Ruef . 3 Grand jurors were se-
lected in a manner similar to the system under attack in this law suit-
each of the 12 judges nominated 12 persons and then 19 jurors were
selected by lot from the pool of 144. 94 Several of these judges were
subject to the influence of Ruef,95 including at least one who was "hand
in glove with Ruef."96
The grand jury impaneled in 1906 was notoriously subservient to
Ruef.17 This panel was selected through the machinations of the grand
jury secretary, Myrtile Cerf, who was a confederate of Ruef. Cerf had
determined the nineteen most favorable nominees before the drawing,
and had folded the slips bearing their names together in a packet,
32 (1963).
92. L. THOMAS, A DEBONAIR SCOUNDREL: AN EPISODE iN THE MORAL HISTORY
OF SAN FRANcisCO 6-40 (1962) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS].
93. Id. at 27.
94. W. BEAN, Boss RUEF'S SAN FRANCISCO: THE STORY OF THE UNION LABOR
PARTY, BIG BusiNEss AND THE, GRAFr PROSECUTION 162 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
BEAN].
95. THOMAS, supra note 92, at 28, 75, 81.
96. Id. at 115.
97. Id. at 47, 80.
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which he was able to feel when he placed his hand in the box at the
official drawing. Thus, he was able to draw the names of nominees
most favorable to Ruef in a process that appeared to be impartial. 98
Freemont Older, editor of the San Francisco Bulletin, discovered this
fraudulent selection process, and when Special Prosecutor Francis J.
Heney initiated his prosecutions, Heney realized that the grand jury
would be an obstacle. Older persuaded Presiding Judge Thomas F.
Graham to discharge the panel and announce the selection of a new
one. 9 Free of Ruef's influence, and finally independent, the new
grand jury promptly indicted Rief, Schmitz and a number of their con-
federates, who were duly prosecuted and convicted.
The selection of the 1975-76 grand jury has been manipulated
and controlled to almost the same extent as was that of the 1906 grand
jury, and, although plaintiffs assume that the motives of the defendants
are on a much higher plane than those of Abraham Ruef, the conscious
manipulation of the selection procedure cannot help but reduce the in-
dependence and impartiality of the resulting grand jury. Rather than
the independent body it has historically been, the 1975-76 San Fran-
cisco Grand Jury will be nothing more than the personal creation of
the presiding judge.
In maintaining their system of personal selection, the defendants
are not only unwittingly undermining a crucial governmental institution,
but also turning their backs on the legitimate aspirations of non-Whites,
women, the poor, and the young, who have just as much of a right to
serve on a "civil" or "investigative" grand jury as on a "criminal" grand
jury. A recent report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights
stressed the importance of the grand jury's investigative role and the
importance of minority representation on the grand jury as follows:
To the extent that -the grand jury considers criminal cases, the pres-
ence of minority jurors minimizes the possibility that prejudice will
affect its deliberations or that laws will not be enforced to protect
minority groups. Equally important for minority groups is the
grand jury's primary function of investigating and evaluating the
administration of local government and the actions of county and
city officials. The effect upon administrative practices of the often
scathing criticisms contained in grand jury reports-and -the re-
sultant publicity-should not be underrated. All in all, a sympa-
thetic and vigilant grand jury could exercise a significant influence
in preventing or correcting misconduct toward minorities. 100
98. BEAN, supra note 94, at 162; THOmAS, supra note 92, at 80.
99. BnAN, supra note 94, at 162.
100. U.S. COM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTm, MoacAN-AmmucANs AND Tim ADMINIsTRA-
TON OF JUSTiCE IN THE Sor.rrnwnsi 113 & Appendix B, at 12 (1970) (study by Califor-
nia Rural Legal Assistance).
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The grand jury has historically been given broad powers because it has
been the people's watchdog into the operations of government. Its
claims to legitimacy rest, however, upon its being representative of the
community at large. Grand jurors can be relied upon to use their al-
most unlimited power wisely only if they bring to their investigations
and deliberations the diverse viewpoints of the community which allow
the grand jurors to act as our collective conscience.
A grand jury composed largely of the affluent and successful
members of our community is unlikely to investigate the concerns of
the poor. An affluent grand jury might, for instance, choose to investi-
gate the banking practices of the city and ignore problems of low-in-
come housing. Or an affluent grand jury may ignore the problems of
hiring discrimination within city agencies. Persons from all sectors of
the city should be involved in deciding how the grand jury should use
its time and exercise its authority.
A commentator who examined the diverse investigations of Cal-
ifornia's grand juries in the 1960's' 0 ' concluded his summary with the
following warning:
The wisdom of these recommendations is not at issue. What these
recommendations show is that grand juries which often are picked
from a small, elite segment of the community are delving into pol-
icy matters that are of concern to and directly affect the total com-
munity. The successful and well-educated do not have a monopoly
of wisdom on drug abuse or welfare policies or the adequacy of
hospital services. The "blue-ribbon" grand jury is deprived of the
insight and perspective of a substantial part of the community that
does not operate in the same circle as Superior Court judges.
Many of the county agencies that concern the grand jury are util-
ized primarily by persons from lower socio-economic groups in the
society, and their views as to the adequacy of county services and
priorities should enter into grand jury deliberations. It does not
answer the issue to state that grand juries can only recommend and
do not determine the ultimate policy; this is no more valid than
arguing that bad government is tolerable so long as there is a check
further on down the line.'"2
Plaintiffs contend that the interests that might be protected by a blue-
ribbon grand jury are totally insufficient, as explained by defendants,
to overcome the compelling and substantial interests of non-Whites,
women, the young, and the poor who have a right to be on the grand
101. See note 71 supra.
102. Mar, The California Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy, I PAC. LJ. 36,
62-63 (1970) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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jury and a right to have their interests represented along with the inter-
ests of the blue-ribbon community.
CONCLUSION
Defendants have agreed that the grand jury that indicts must be
representative. But they have, without precedent or authority, split off
the crucial investigative function and sought to control it and keep it
as part of their own domain. The law requires that defendants be
ordered to select grand jurors randomly from some neutral list, like the
list of registered voters, in order to ensure that the grand juries of San
Francisco are truly independent and impartial. Such an order is re-
quired by the United States Constitution, because defendants have re-
peatedly and consistently demonstrated that they are unable to impanel
a fair cross-section of the community through their present system of
nominating their friends and acquaintances. The statistics assembled
in Appendix A demonstrate unmistakably that the dramatic underrep-
resentation of non-Whites, women, the poor, and the young continues
unabated at the present time.
A change to a more neutral selection method, already half accom-
plished, is simple, practical, will help restore confidence in an important
governmental institution, and will likely improve the quality of our
grand juries. A recent commentator, Deputy Attorney General A.
Wells Peterson, reported his findings of grand juries in other parts of
California as follows:
Three counties in California-Butte, Merced, and Ventura-now
impanel a single, randomly selected grand jury. Public officials
contacted in these counties reported grand juries selected by this
system have been of high quality.'
0 3
San Francisco is similarly filled with competent citizens who would
undertake the high responsibility of grand jury service with diligence
and care. The patronizing attitude of the defendants who think that
only their acquaintances can perform this service is an insult to the non-
Whites, women, younger people, and those not fortunate enough to be
wealthy or live in elite neighborhoods, all of whom have been system-
atically excluded from what should be a vigorous and independent in-
strument of effective government. The defendants' personal selection
method is no more constitutionally permissible for the investigative
grand jury than for the indicting grand jury and must be remedied by
this court.
103. Peterson, The California Grand Jury System: A Review and Suggestions for
Reform, 5 PAC. L.J. 1, 7 (1974) (emphasis added).
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STATISTICS
[In several affidavits accompanying the statistics in Appendices A
and B, affiants described in varying degrees of detail the methods by
which they collected their data. Affiant Douglas P. Elliott elaborated
on the sources for each category of statistics:]
A. Information on age was obtained from questionnaires [sent
to all grand jury nominees] and phone conversations [with nominees
who did not return the questionnaires].
B. Information on race was obtained in the following ways:
Anglo-Europeans and Blacks were self-identified through the question-
naires and phone conversations described above. Some Asians and
persons of Hispanic descent were identified in the same manner, while
the rest were identified on the basis of their surnames. Thus, it was
concluded that all persons of Asian and Hispanic background were
identified, and all persons remaining in the "unknown" category must
be either Anglo-European or Black.
C. Information on sex was readily obtainable from the names of
the individuals, and the fact that the females were listed in public rec-
ords as "Miss" or "Mrs."
D. Information on occupation was obtained from the public lists
of grand jury nominees. Particular occupations were classified as
"white collar" or "blue collar" in accordance with the definitions and
classifications of the United States Bureau of Census.
E. Information on income was derived from questionnaires and
telephone conversations.
F. Information on geographic area was obtained by taking the
addresses listed in public records and locating these addresses on a map
of San Francisco, which had been marked to indicate the geographic
boundaries of the poverty areas.
[A second affiant, Kevin V. Reilly, described the method by
which a number of law students obtained racial and income data from
persons who were nominated or who volunteered to serve on the San
Francisco grand jury for the years 1970 through 1974-75 and about
whom plaintiffs had not previously gathered such information:]
Using the names and addresses of potential grand jurors obtained
from public records, the law students attempted to obtain telephone
numbers from the telephone directory or from the telephone company's
information service. If the number was found and the potential juror
reached, the caller explained who he or she was and the reason the
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call was being made. Each person was then asked (1) what his or
her race or ethnic group is and (2) whether his or her family income
was above or.below $11,000 in the year he or she was a potential grand
juror. In a few instances, the potential juror was unavailable, and the
information was obtained from a member of the family.
Answers were received from approximately 25 percent of those
potential jurors we attempted to reach, and those answers are included
in the data in Appendix A. Many of the people to be called had
moved or had unlisted numbers. Many refused to answer. Others
were never at home when called, although all the numbers were called
a number of times.
[In a third affidavit, attorney Ruth Astle, who had furnished statis-
tics concerning the demographic composition of the San Francisco
grand jury to the plaintiffs in Quadra, described that the information
had resulted from letters, telephone conversations, and personal inter-
views, and added that the data had been collected "with enormous care
because of the important issues involved in grand jury selection."
The fourth affidavit is set out in full, as extensive reference is
made to it throughout:]
I, JON VAN DYKE, hereby depose and say:
1. I am a Professor of Law at the Hastings College of the Law
and one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in this case;
2. I have personally viewed the selection of the 1972 San Fran-
cisco Grand Jury and many of the sessions in which the 1975 grand
jury was selected;
3. For those sessions that I was unable personally to attend, I
have asked law students under my supervision to attend and to report
to me what transpired at these sessions;
4. This work has been undertaken with as much care as is
humanly possible.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.





In the data that follow, plaintiffs have used the term "Rate of Er-
ror" to give some indication of the extent of under- or over-representa-
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tion that has existed on San Francisco's grand juries. The "Rate of
Error" is obtained by taking the difference between the percentage a
given demographic group has on a grand jury and the percentage that
demographic group has in the County of San Francisco, and then divid-
ing that figure by the demographic group's percentage of the county
population. Thus, if males constituted 50 percent of the county popu-
lation, but held 80 percent of the seats on the grand jury, the "Rate
of Error" would be: 80-50=30:50=+60. In this example, the
"Rate of Error" for females would be: 20-50=-30 50= -60. If
the figure is preceded by a plus (+) sign, that population group is over-
represented, and if the figure is preceded by a minus (-) sign, the popu-
lation group is under-represented. Any over- or under-representation of
more than 20 percent should be viewed with concern, particularly if
it persists over several years.
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Not yet eligible for jury duty
0 0 0 0
2 1.7 2 6.7
3 2.6 1 3.3
7 6.0 2 6.7
9 7.7 1 3.3
23 19.7 4 13.3
23 19.7 4 13.3
25 21.4 7 23.3
14 12.0 6 20.0
8 6.8 2 6.7
2 1.7 1 3.3
1 0.9
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30 - 34 6 5.2 2 6.7 2 10.5
35 - 39 8 6.9 3 10.0 1 5.3
40 -44 7 6.0 2 6.7 1 5.3
45 - 49 17 14.7 4 13.3 3 15.8
50 - 54 22 19.0 5 16.7 3 15.8
55 - 59 18 15.5 5 16.7 4 21.1
60 - 64 25 21.6 6 20.0 3 15.8
65 - 69 6 5.2 2 6.7 2 10.5
70 - 74 1 0.9 0 0 0 0
Over 75 1 0.9 0 0 0 0
Total 116 100.2 30 100.1 19 100.1
All Nominees Finalists Grand Jurors
Rate of Rate of Rate of
# % Error # % Error # % Error
21 - 40 19 16.4 -62.6 6 20.0 -54.3 3 15.8 -63.9
Over 40 97 83.6 +48.8 24 80.0 +42.3 16 84.2 +49.8
Total 116 100.0 30 100.0 19 100.0
1974-75 Grand Jury
All Nominees Finalists Grand Jurors
18 - 20 1 1.0 0 0 0 0
21 -24 1 1.0 0 0 0 0
25 - 29 2 2.0 0 0 0 0
30 - 34 7 6.9 I 7.1 1 10.0
35 - 39 4 4.0 0 0 0 0
40 -44 10 9.9 2 14.3 1 10.0
45 - 49 17 16.8 4 28.6 3 30.0
50 - 54 24 23.8 3 21.4 3 30.0
55 - 59 14 13.9 0 0 0 0
60 - 64 11 10.9 0 0 0 0
65 - 69 6 5.9 2 14.3 1 10.0
70 - 74 4 4.0 2 14.3 1 10.0
Over 75 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Poverty Areas
The five poverty areas that have been used to illustrate discrimina-
tion against the poor have been picked by examining economic indi-
cators in the 1970 census material on San Francisco. The areas that
have been selected as poverty areas are marked by rental units with
a value of less than $125 a month, housing units valued at less than
$25,000 each, and median family incomes of less than $10,000 a
year, usually substantially less. These areas contain high percentages
of non-White residents.
The specific census tracts covered by these poverty areas are as
follows:
Central City: Census Tracts 110-11, 120-25, 176, 178-80, 226-
27, and 607.
Chinatown: Census Tracts 106-07, 113-15, and 118.
Hunters Point-Bayview: Census Tracts 230-34, 606, and 608-10.
Mission: Census Tracts 169, 177, 201-03, 207-10, 214-15, 228-
29 and 251-54.
Western Addition: Census Tracts 151, 153, 155, and 158-68.
The attached map indicates the boundaries of these zones.
[Vol. 27
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Remainder of City 356,700
Total 555,798
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Race
San Francisco County-1970 Census
(Adjusted) (Over 18 Population)
White Number Percent
Anglo-European 359,284 61.2
Hispanic Origin 85,442 14.6
Black 64,993 11.1
Asian 77,026 13.1
Total Non-White* 227,461 38.8
Note: These racial figures have been computed through the following method: The
1970 census figures as originally published indicated that Whites of Anglo-European
descent numbered 352,585, persons of Hispanic origin numbered 67,277, Blacks num-
bered 60,346, and Asians numbered 75,590. Subsequently the Census Bureau announced
that it had undercounted Blacks nationally by 7.7 percent and Whites by 1.9 percent.
The figures for Blacks and Whites have thus been adjusted by these percentages. More
recently, the Census Bureau announced that it had undercounted persons of Hispanic
origin in California by 27 percent; Hispanic figures have thus been increased by this
amount. The Asian population has been increased by 1.9 percent, on the theory that
this group must have been undercounted by at least the same percent as the Whites;
almost certainly the undercount is greater, but no official announcement has yet been
made to plaintiffs' knowledge.
* The term "Total Non-White" includes Whites of Hispanic origin.
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Number Percent Rate of Error
16 84.2 +37.6
n n
Total 40 100.0 19
Total Non-White 3*
* One of the two Asians on the 1974-75 grand jury resigned
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Note: The median family income in San Francisco in 1970 was $10,503. Plaintiffs have
attempted to obtain information about the income level of grand jurors, but these fig-
ures are the most incomplete of all. The figures that are available are offered above.
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Previous Positions in Government of City and County
of San Francisco
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Karesh
Kennedy
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All information for Appendix B was obtained from CALiFORNIA COuRTS AND JurDGES
HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1975) and from Chaitin, Coutin, Dressler & Goldman,
"Study of the Superior Court of San Francisco" (1972) (a paper based on ques-
tionnaires and personal interviews, on file at Public Advocates).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
INDIANA QUADRA, et al.,
Plaintiffs No. C-72-1689 CBR
vs. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN AN-
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN SWER TO DEFENDANTS'MO-
CITRANDSCOU Y eF a, TION FOR PARTIAL SUM-
FRANCISCO et al.,MAYUD EN
Defendants MARYJUDGMENT
CONTENTS
Statement of Facts 623
Argument 626
I. Introduction 626
II. Defendants' Selection Method Unquestionably Violates
Constitutional Standards - 626
III. Because the "Civil" or "Investigative" Grand Jury Con-
sists so Predominately of Older Affluent White Males,
They Are Unlikely To Investigate the Concerns of the
Young, the Poor, Non-Whites, and Women 627
IV. As a Direct Result of the Unconstitutional Selection
Process, the 1975-76 "Civil" or "Investigative" Grand
Jury Is Filled with Persons Who Have Serious Past and
Present Conflicts of Interests Because of Ties with Per-
sons Holding Office. These Conflicts Deprive the Grand
Jury of Its Independence and Impartiality and Deny to
the Body the Legitimacy Needed for Its Investigations
and Reports To Be Accepted as Legitimate and Fair.
Instead the Grand Jury Has Been Transformed into an
Overfly Political Body ------------- 629
Conclusion 630
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the time of filing of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Presiding Judge Robert J. Drewes has completed the selection
of the "civil" or "investigative" grand jury for 1975-76. On August
14, 1975, the last five of the sixty persons examined by the presiding
January 19761 QUADRA v. SUPERIOR COURT
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judge were summoned to court and after they were asked a few stand-
ard questions about their backgrounds and possible conflicts of inter-
ests, Judge Drewes announced his selections.104 As defendants in-
tended (and publicly announced),'0 5 the new grand jury is a true blue
ribbon panel. The group of nineteen includes three former members
of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (Roger Boas, Harold Dobbs,
and Clarissa McMahon), a former president of the San Francisco Board
of Education (Alan H. Nichols), a person with long experience with
the San Francisco Community College District (Lloyd D. Luckmann),
and a retired lieutenant in the San Francisco Police Department (Alan
A. Rosenbaum). The grand jury contains not one blue collar worker
but does have five attorneys and two accountants. One of the attor-
neys (Richard Sims III) has been counsel to Sheriff Richard Hongisto
and is currently active in organizing the campaign of Joe Freitas, a can-
didate attempting to oust incumbent John J. Ferdon, the city's district
attorney. Harold Dobbs has unsuccessfully run for mayor in several
recent elections. 10 6
Fifteen of the nineteen grand jurors are men, only four are
women. Women are thus under-represented by 59.7 percent (or have
only two-fifths the number of grand jurors their percentage of the San
Francisco population demands).' Fourteen of the grand jurors are
Whites of Anglo-European descent, two are Black, two are Chinese,
and one is of Hispanic origin. Non-Whites are thus under-represented
by 32.2 percent (or, put another way, have about one-third fewer per-
sons on the grand jury than they should have). None of the grand
jurors are under the age of twenty-seven, and although seven are under
forty (the highest number in recent years) this group is still under-rep-
resented and should have eight or nine members. Ten of the grand
jurors are over fifty, giving that demographic group about 50 percent
104. The presiding judge did not explain the reasons why he excused the 41 unac-
ceptable nominees, except in two or three cases of ill health or physical absence.
[Notes of Douglas P. Elliott, dated Aug. 14, 1975 (on file in Professor Van Dyke's
office).]
105. [See Certificate with Transcript of Deposition in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment of Aug. 12, 1975, Quadra v. Superior Ct., Civil No. C-72-1689 (filed
Sept. 20, 1972).]
106. This information about the grand jurors was gathered by personal observation
and by examination of standard reference books such as Martindale-Hubbell Law Di-
rectory and Who's Who in the West. See Affidavit of Jon Van Dyke in Plaintiffs' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment; Affidavit of Douglas P. Elliott, attached to this Reply
Brief. For a full description of the 1975-76 grand jurors, see Appendix A.
107. For a full listing of the demographic breakdown of the 1975-76 grand jury,
see Appendix B.
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greater representation than its percentage of the population would war-
rant.
The 1975-76 Grand Jury does not come from all parts of San
Francisco, but instead is heavily concentrated in the affluent areas of
town. Only three are located in the city's poverty areas,1 08 and these
three are located in what must be the most affluent sections of the pov-
erty areas; two live near Polk Street in the valley below Nob Hill and
Alan Nichols lives in North Beach just north of Chinatown. These lo-
cations are included in the "poverty areas" only because the census
tracts used to determine those poverty areas sometimes include both
affluent and poor areas. Not one grand juror lives in Hunters Point-
Bayview, the Mission, or the Western Addition. One lives a block
from Coit Tower, one lives on top of Nob Hill, one lives on Russian
Hill, four live in the Sunset district, and eight live in Pacific and
Presidio Heights, where Judge Drewes also lives.
None of the grand jurors is in any sense poor, most are definitely
affluent. And, in addition to neglecting the entire blue collar popula-
tion of San Francisco (and excusing without reason the few nominees
that had ties to the labor movement), the presiding judge seems to have
emphasized certain special interests in his final selections. Persons
with ties to the construction and development industries seem to dom-
inate the present grand jury. Two grand jurors have formerly been
employed by the Bechtel Corporation and a third is associated with the
law firm of Thelen, Marrin, Johnson and Bridges, which represents
Bechtel as well as other large construction companies. Another attor-
ney is associated with the law firm of Jacobs, Sills, and Coblentz, and
one of the women on the grand jury is married to an attorney also asso-
ciated with that firm, which has as clients several of the area's largest
construction and development corporations. Still another attorney,
Alan H. Nichols, has as a client the Building Industry Conference
Board of San Francisco, and in addition is legal counsel to the Eastshore
Park Project Corporation of San Francisco, which has been asked by
the board of supervisors to prepare a development program for the Port
of San Francisco. The grand jury thus seems heavily biased in favor
of further development in San Francisco, one of the controversial issues
toward which the grand jury should assume an independent and impar-
tial stance.
The 1975-76 San Francisco Grand Jury is thus a blue ribbon panel
by any standard. Richard 0. Herman, a life insurance salesman who
108. For the boundaries of the poverty areas, see Appendix A of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment.
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married one of Judge Drewes's close friends twenty-five years ago and
had been nominated by Judge Drewes on five previous occasions (but
was nominated by Judge Rolph this time) was named by Judge Drewes
to be foreman. Seven of the nineteen grand jurors were nominated
by either Judge Drewes or Judge Rolph, the only two of the twenty-




The grand jury finally selected by the presiding judge accentuates
the issue posed in this case--can a grand jury with the enormous power
to scrutinize every operation of San Francisco's city and county govern-
ment, the power to demand information from any one in the city, the
power to issue reports on any subject whatsoever, and the power to
bring impeachment proceedings against every public official in the city
and county government be selected by means that would be unques-
tionably unconstitutional if the grand jury had the one additional power
of filing criminal indictments? The presiding judge's personally se-
lected grand jury contains many members who have been active in the
city's political life and who may well be tempted to use their powerful
position for partisan ends. They come almost exclusively from the
upper economic strata of our diverse city and will undoubtedly dwell
on the interests of the affluent rather than the problems of the poor.
They are likely to ignore the problems of discrimination against
women. They are unrepresentative of this heterogeneous city by any
standard.
II. Defendants' Selection Method Unquestionably
Violates Constitutional Standards.
Defendants have misinformed the court when they have asserted
that this court is bound by White v. State,10 9 because the United States
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in that case for want of a substan-
tial federal question, 1 0 and that "this constitutes an affirmance on the
merits."'111
109. 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849 (1973). This case was subsequently overruled
by State v. Gould, 232 Ga. 844, 209 S.E.2d 312 (1974).
110. 414 U.S. 886, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
111. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Aug. 12, 1975, at 8, Quadra v. Superior Ct., Civil No. C-72-1689 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept.
20, 1972).
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The current interpretation of such a dismissal has been sum-
marized by Stanford Professor Paul Brest as follows:
The dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion is in theory an adjudication on the merits. But as the Court,
faced with an increasing workload, has used this formula to dispose
of appeals obviously presenting nontrivial federal questions, dismis-
sal has come to be viewed as lying between an affirmance after
full argument and a denial of certiorari. 1 2
The correct standard by which to judge grand jury selection is as
stated in this court's earlier opinion, that where the "opportunity to dis-
criminate" is clear, as it certainly is under this selection process, it is
proper to examine statistics to see whether a prima facie case of dis-
crimination has been established. And if those statistics indicate a sub-
stantial under-representation over a period of time, then the burden
shifts to the government to explain that under-representation." :3 The
defendants have not been able to justify satisfactorily the discrimination
in this case, nor can they, because they have conceded that members
of under-represented groups would be just as competent to serve as
grand jurors as those now selected to serve."14
In fact, this case truly presents a situation in which an "intent to
discriminate" exists, because the presiding judge set out to impanel a
grand jury with superior educational qualifications and with experience
in the city and county government" 5 and because of past discrimination
that inevitably means a grand jury that is dominated by affluent White
males. The requirement of experience means the grand jury will
underrepresent the young. "An educational qualification in a particu-
lar historical, social context, may not be neutral."" 0-6 In the context
of a city as diverse as San Francisco, the presiding judge's high qualifi-
cations are certainly not neutral, but exclude large numbers of the city's
population.
m1. Because the "Civil" or "Investigative" Grand Jury
Consists so Predominantly of Older Affluent White
112. P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTrrUTIONAL DECISONMAKMIN 78-79 (1975), cit-
ing Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 615-17, 487 P.2d 1241, 1263-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
623-24 (1971); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME CoURT PRAcncE 193-202 (4th ed.
1969); Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CM.
L. Rnv. 1, 74 n.365 (1964).
113. See Quadra v. Superior Ct., 378 F. Supp. 605, 613-15 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
114. See Judge Drewes's deposition, supra note 13, at 32, 37.
115. Id. at 21-22.
116. Quadra v. Superior Ct., 378 F. Supp. 605, 616 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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Males, They Are Unlikely To Investigate the Con-
cerns of the Young, the Poor, Non-Whites, and
Women.
It is unrealistic to expect a group of persons who come so predomi-
nantly from one economic and social stratum to be concerned broadly
about every problem that the citizens of San Francisco face. Persons
are naturally alert to problems they personally experience, and only if
a grand jury contains persons from a diverse mix of the geographical,
social, racial, and ethnic groups in this city, containing representative
numbers from the two sexes and the various age groupings, can we be
sure that the grand jury will evenhandedly concern itself with all the
problems of San Francisco.
Older males are unlikely to investigate sexual discrimination in
hiring. If, for instance, the City Attorney's Office had a disproportion-
ate number of male attorneys, the 1975-76 grand jury would not be
likely to examine the causes of such a phenomenon. Without repre-
sentation from those who have recently graduated from the high schools
and higher educational institutions of San Francisco, the grand jury is
unlikely to examine student complaints at those institutions.
Poor people are familiar with city departments that this grand jury
knows nothing about-the Social Services Department, for instance,
which administers the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram, the Food Stamps program, General Assistance, Medi-Cal, and
other programs designed to aid the poor, but often inadequately
staffed. This grand jury is unlikely to examine the Redevelopment
Agency, which has often been accused of insensitivity toward the
poorer residents of San Francisco.
A grand jury that is almost 80 percent male is unlikely to investi-
gate the adequacy of the pap smears administered by the city's Health
Department, a cause of much concern to the women who are obliged
to use that service. With a substantial underrepresentation of non-
Whites on the grand jury, it is unlikely that this body will devote exten-
sive time to the problem of police-community relations that is a major
concern of non-Whites and those who live in the less affluent sectors
of the city. Non-Whites and those in poorer neighborhoods frequently
feel that their neighborhoods are given less adequate service when it
comes to fire-fighting, crime prevention, and the cleaning of streets and
beautification of public areas. This type of discrimination is unlikely
to be investigated if no persons from the poorest areas of the city are
on the grand jury. Because such services are likely to vary from district
(Vol. 27
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to district, impartial investigations will be conducted only if persons
from all parts of town are on the grand jury and many different views
are represented.
The rich will probably approach city problems with a strong con-
cern about the saving of taxes. The poor are likely to be more con-
cerned about the adequacy of city services. The list of examples of
concerns left unrepresented on the 1975-76 grand jury could be con-
tinued endlessly. The simple and important point is that many diverse
views must be adequately represented on a grand jury if it is to perform
its historical role of serving as an impartial and independent watchdog
over city agencies.
IV. As a Direct Result of the Unconstitutional Selection
Process, the 1975-76 "Civil" or "Investigative"
Grand Jury Is Filled with Persons Who Have Seri-
ous Past and Present Conflicts of Interests Because
of Ties with Persons Holding Office. These Conflicts
Deprive the Grand Jury of Its Independence and
Impartiality and Deny to the Body the Legitimacy
Needed for Its Investigations and Reports To Be Ac-
cepted as Legitimate and Fair. Instead the Grand
Jury Has Been Transformed into an Overtly Politi-
cal Body.
When the 1974-75 San Francisco Grand Jury recently issued its
year-end reports, some of them sharply critical of high city officials, the
officials attacked the grand jurors as incompetent and biased in their
perspective. 117 The grand jury has thus already been transformed to
some extent into a partisan body, and that transformation is complete
with the 1975-76 grand jury. Containing several prominent defeated
politicians, others who have served the city in high office during earlier
periods, and at least one young lawyer (Richard Sims IL) active in a
current campaign to defeat an incumbent (the district attorney), the
grand jury will be attacked as politically motivated no matter what kind
of a report it issues. How can Mr. Sims be expected to investigate im-
partially the District Attorney, whom he clearly thinks should be re-
moved from office? How can Harold Dobbs investigate impartially
Mayor Alioto, who has defeated Mr. Dobbs' recent attempts to become
mayor himself?
In order to maintain the respect and legitimacy the grand jury has
historically held, this body must be selected by means that insulate it
117. See notes 26, 28 & accompanying text supra.
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from all possibility of political manipulation. It not only must be free
from conflicts of interest, but also must be free from all appearance
of such conflicts. A hand-picked group of persons selected because
of their past activity and containing many prominent and politically ac-
tive members of the community cannot be expected to view all allega-
tions of corruption or inefficiency impartially. Many of these grand
jurors admitted during their testimony that they knew many persons
still in the city government. 118 Many serious allegations of possible
corruption have been raised by the 1974-75 grand jury. The incoming
grand jury cannot be expected to investigate those allegations impar-
tially. The grand jurors will be guided by their political views and their
personal friendship with or enmity toward those persons attacked. The
people of San Francisco will not be able to accept this grand jury's in-
vestigations as an impartial view of the matter.
CONCLUSION
This case in a sense presents a case of first impression because
the defendants have created an institution that has never existed be-
fore, a "civil" or "investigative" grand jury that, according to the de-
fendants' double standard, is permissible even though it is grossly un-
representative of San Francisco's population. Such a proposition has
never been accepted by any court and must not be accepted now.
Instead, defendants should be obliged to select grand jurors by the
simple and inexpensive method that is used in the vast majority of juris-
dictions throughout the United States-random selection from some
neutral list such as the list of registered voters. Such a system would
insure the independence and impartiality of the grand jury and give
that body's investigations and reports the respect and legitimacy they
must have if the grand jury is to be of service as the "people's watch-
dog" over government agencies.
FURTHER STATISTICS
[An affidavit by Jon Van Dyke which accompanied the following
tables explained that the statistics were compiled from official data pro-
vided by defendants regarding age, sex, address, and occupation of the
grand jurors and from personal observations by the affiant and by law
students whom he supervised in sessions at which prospective 1975-
76 grand jurors were questioned.]
118. See affidavit of Jon Van Dyke attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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Number Percent Number Percent
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3 5.0 3 15.8
5 8.3 2 10.5
4 6.7 2 10.5
3 5.0 1 5.3
11 18.3 1 5.3
9 15.0 2 10.5
6 10.0 2 10.5
8 13.3 3 15.8
7 11.7 1 5.3
4 6.7 2 10.5
0 0 0 0
60 100.0 19 100.0
Rate of Rate of
Error Error
20.0 -54.3 7 36.8 -16.0















































Rate of Rate of Rate of
Error Error Error
White Collar 53 98.1 +59.3 38 97.4 +58.1 14 100.0 +62.0
Blue Collar 1 1.9 -95.1 1 2.6 -93.2 0 0 -100.0
















































































[An affidavit by Douglas P. Elliott explained that the following
biographical information about the persons selected for the 1975-76
San Francisco grand jury was obtained from the testimony of the grand
jurors themselves and from standard reference books.]
Breyer, Charles R., 1444 Kearny Street (Telegraph Hill one block
from Coit Tower), White, male, 33 years old, nominated by Judge
Shaw. Formerly an assistant district attorney, and a member of
the staff of Special Prosecutors Cox and Jaworski. Now associ-
ated with the law firm of Jacobs, Sills, and Coblentz, whose clients
include several large construction and development corporations.
Bentson, Harold J., 2329 Laguna Street (Pacific Heights), White,
male, 72 years old, nominated by Judge Rolph. Retired engineer,
formerly employed by Bechtel Corporation.
Boas, Roger, 3329 Washington Street (Pacific Heights), White, male,
53 years old, nominated by Judge Drewes. President of Boas
Pontiac. Producer-moderator of international news analysis,
"World Press", weekly show on KQED. San Francisco Board of
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Supervisors, 1961-73. Chairman Cal. Demo. Central Comm.
1968-71; Demo. nominee for 6th Cong. Dist. 1972 (defeated);
Bd. of Directors, Park Presidio YMCA and World Affairs Council;
No. Cal. Member of Olympic, Concordia-Argonant Clubs.
Carr, Elizabeth A., 1426 -6th Avenue, (Inner Sunset), Black, female,
44 years old, nominated by Judge Cragen. High school teacher,
South San Francisco.
Chin, Gordon, 1625 Larkin Street (near Polk Street), Chinese, male,
27 years old, nominated by Judge Low. Employment advocate,
Chinese for Affirmative Action.
Dickinson, Maurice L., 810 Gonzalez Drive (Park Merced), White,
male, 73 years old, nominated by Judge Rolph. Retired civil en-
gineer, formerly a consultant for Bechtel and other groups;
worked with Hetch Hetchy Project.
Dobbs, Harold S., 1000 Mason Street (Nob Hill), White, male, 56
years old, nominated by Judge Drewes. Attorney, Dobbs, Doyle
and Nielsen, member, San Francisco Board of Supervisors, 1951-
63; frequent unsuccessful candidate for mayor. Formerly owner
of Mel's Drive-In. Member of Hastings Law School Board of Di-
rectors.
Fong, Katheryn M., (Pro Tem secretary): 1409 Sacramento (near
Polk Street), Chinese, female, 29 years old, nominated by Judge
Low. Graduate student, doing thesis on international relations.
Former member of civil service task force, which was involved in
affirmative action work and communication with minority groups.
Garrett, David, 2617 Divisadero Street (Pacific Heights), White, male,
39 years old, nominated by Judge Brown. Audit manager of
Safeway Stores, earns between $25,000 and $50,000.
Herman, Richard 0., (Foreman), 3461 Washington Street (Presidio
Heights), White, male, 62 years old, nominated by Judge Rolph,
but Judge Drewes nominated him in 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, and
1974. An independent life insurance agent, earning between
$25,000 and $50,000. He is the brother of CBS correspondent
George Herman. He married a close friend of Judge Drewes 25
years ago.
Lemus, Jessie, 260 Corbett Avenue (Twin Peaks), Hispanic, male, 36
years old, nominated by Judge Brown. Grants Manager for Per-
sonnel, employed by U.S. Civil Service Comm.
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Luckmann, Lloyd D., 3806 Clay Street (Presidio Heights), White,
male, 65 years old, nominated by Judge Shaw. College Adminis-
trator, Lincoln University, formerly at the University of San Fran-
cisco. Worked for the Community College District from 1935-
1968.
McMahon, Clarissa, 2201 Leavenworth (Russian Hill), White, female,
63 years old, nominated by Judge Rolph. Retired attorney,
formerly associated with Richard C. Shortall (brother). Former
member of board of supervisors, 1953-1966.
"The Scam What Am: One appointee to the new civil
grand jury-the so-called "watchdog over all city agen-
cies"-is causing heads to swivel. That would be the re-
doubtable Clarissa McMahon, who resigned in a great hurry
from the Bd. of Supes in '66 after a rash of bad publicity
about a real estate deal and the high price of fire hydrants
sold to the city by her then close pal and client, Stuart Green-
berg. Purely coincidental, of course. "Must devote more
time to my law practice," she said. . . ." Herb Caen, San
Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1975, p. 33, Col. 1.
Nichols, Alan H., 566 Vallejo Street (North Beach), White, male, 45
years old, nominated by Judge Drewes. Previous positions: pres-
ident, Young Republicans of San Francisco, 1957; president,
Young Republicans of California, 1959; vice-president, National
Young Republicans, 1960-61; member, San Francisco Library
Commission, 1962-65; member 1966-71 and president 1970-71,
San Francisco Board of Education and San Francisco City College.
Author of article and books on water distribution in California.
Currently practices law in San Francisco. His clients include the
Eastshore Park Project Corporation of the City and County of San
Francisco (which has been asked to prepare a development pro-
gram for San Francisco port by the board of supervisors), the
Building Industry Conference Board of San Francisco, and an un-
identified corporation being sued for nonpayment of rent by the
San Francisco port.
Poole, Charlotte, 90 Cedro Avenue (Sunset), Black, female, 57 years
old, nominated by Judge Brown. Wife of Cecil F. Poole, formerly
a U.S. Attorney, now associated with the law firm of Jacobs, Sills,
and Coblentz, whose clients include several large construction and
development corporations.
January 19763
Rosenbaum, Alan A., 2283-27th Avenue, (Sunset), White, male, 62
years old, nominated by Judge Cragen. Retired police lieutenant,
formerly employed by San Francisco Police Department.
Shapiro, William, 3778 Washington Street (Presidio Heights), White,
male, 28 years old, nominated by Judge Karesh. Urban Planner,
employed by U.C. Medical Center at San Francisco.
Sims, Richard Il, 2579 Sacramento (Pacific Heights), White, male, 31
years old, nominated by Judge Dandurand. Son of a state appel-
late judge. Previously executive director of the Mayor's Task
Force on Crime and counsel to Sheriff Richard Hongisto. Cur-
rently practicing law with the firm of Thelen, Marrin, Johnson &
Bridges, whose clients include several of the largest construction
companies in the United States, including the Bechtel Corpora-
tion. In July 1975 signed a letter urging other lawyers to support
the candidacy of Joe Freitas for district attorney.
Tentes, Spiron J., 2051 Broadway Street, (Pacific Heights), White,
male, 54 years old, nominated by Judge Vavuris. Public ac-
countant.
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